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Abstract
Classic theories for the evolution of property rights consider the emergence of
private property to be a progressive development reflecting a society’s movement
to a more efficient property regime. This article argues that instead of this progres-
sive dynamic, a more subtle and damaging chain reaction dynamic can come into
play that traditional theories for intellectual and other property rights neither antic-
ipate nor explain. The article suggests that the expansion of intellectual and other
property rights have an internally generative dynamic. Drawing upon contempo-
rary case studies, the article argues that property rights evolve in reaction to each
other. The creation of property rights for some engenders the demand for related
property rights by others. These demands and resulting recognition of property
rights may have little to do with the value of the resource in question or efficiency
concerns. Today’s global economy makes the collateral creation of property rights
more pronounced because changes in property rights in one country can trigger
unanticipated changes in the property regimes of another. The article offers three
explanations for why property rights beget more property rights. The first draws
on group behavior theory; the second focuses on a breach of a cooperative norm;
the third flows from the right of exclusion. The chain reaction evolution of prop-
erty rights helps explain why intellectual property rights have vastly expanded
over the last several decades and continue to expand. It also sheds light on the
increased transformation of spaces and tangible goods from open access or com-
mons property to exclusive ownership regimes. The chain reaction theory of the
evolution of intellectual and other property rights has considerable implications. It
anticipates the development of unexpected, extensive and ultimately undesirable
property regimes. Forthcoming 82 Notre Dame Law Review (2007)
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Abstract:  Classic theories for the evolution of property rights consider the emergence of 
private property to be a progressive development reflecting a society’s movement to a 
more efficient property regime.  This article argues that instead of this progressive 
dynamic, a more subtle and damaging chain reaction dynamic can come into play that 
traditional theories for intellectual and other property rights neither anticipate nor explain.  
The article suggests that the expansion of intellectual and other property rights have an 
internally generative dynamic.  Drawing upon contemporary case studies, the article 
argues that property rights evolve in reaction to each other.  The creation of property 
rights for some engenders the demand for related property rights by others.  These 
demands and resulting recognition of property rights may have little to do with the value 
of the resource in question or efficiency concerns.  Today’s global economy makes the 
collateral creation of property rights more pronounced because changes in property rights 
in one country can trigger unanticipated changes in the property regimes of another. 
 
The article offers three explanations for why property rights beget more property rights.  
The first draws on group behavior theory; the second focuses on a breach of a 
cooperative norm; the third flows from the right of exclusion.  The chain reaction 
evolution of property rights helps explain why intellectual property rights have vastly 
expanded over the last several decades and continue to expand.  It also sheds light on the 
increased transformation of spaces and tangible goods from open access or commons 
property to exclusive ownership regimes.  The chain reaction theory of the evolution of 
intellectual and other property rights has considerable implications.  It anticipates the 
development of unexpected, extensive and ultimately undesirable property regimes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In 1980, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its seminal Chakrabarty decision.1  That 
decision permitted the patenting, and hence the private ownership, of man-made living 
organisms.  What the reams of paper filed in this watershed case did not anticipate was 
how the patenting of genetically-modified organisms would cause nations and individuals 
responsively to assert property rights over naturally-occurring biological and genetic 
material. The propertization of living organisms and their genetic material did not remain 
cabined to “man’s handiwork.”  Rather, it set off an unexpected chain reaction of 
collateral propertization of unmodified genetic and other biological material. 
 
Until recently, nations and individuals treated genetic material – the subcellular 
sequences that direct the structure and characteristics of all living things – as open access 
property.2  Like information in the public domain, genetic resources were available in 
principle for the use of all.3  No one held an exclusive ownership interest in this material, 
and individuals and countries freely shared samples of seeds, soil and even animal 
specimens containing it.4  In sharp contrast, today extensive ownership rights envelop 
genetic material.  Individuals and corporations patent genetic sequences that they have 
isolated.5  Meanwhile, national governments of developing countries, which house most 
                                                          
1 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
 
2 Kal Raustiala and David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources, 58 INT’L ORG 277, 
284 (2004)(“For most of human history, the rule of common heritage governed [plant genetic resources].”); 
Cary Fowler, Protecting Farmer Innovation: The Convention on Biological Diversity and the Question of 
Origin, JURIMETRICS 477, 480 (2001): John M. Adair, The Bioprospecting Question: Should the United 
States Charge Biotechnology Companies for the Commercial Use of Public Wild Genetic Resource? 24 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 131, 141 (1997) (noting that access to all wild genetic resources had traditionally been 
open); and Edgar Asebey and Jill Kempenaar, Biodiversity Prospecting: Fulfilling the Mandate of the 
Biodiversity Convention, 28 VAND. J. INT’L LAW 703, 718 (1995).  Briefly, the cells of all living things 
contain genes.  Genes code for proteins, and proteins determine the structure and characteristics of life 
forms.  Matt Ridley, GENOME 6-9 (1999).  
 
3 Sabrina Safrin, Hyperownership in a Time of Biotechnological Promise: The International Conflict to 
Control the Buildings Block of Life, 98 AMER. J. OF INT’L L. 641, 644 (2004). 
 
4 Id. at 641, 644-645.   
 
5 While a gene or a genetic sequence in its natural state cannot be patented, a patent may issue if the 
naturally-occurring gene is synthesized from its original state and ascribed a useful function. See Utility 
Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092 (Jan. 5, 2001) and Linda J. Demaine & Aaron Xavier Fallmeth, 
Reinventing the Double Helix: A Novel and Nonobvious Reconceptualization of the Biotechnology Patent, 
55 STAN. L. REV. 303, 359 (2002).  For example, no patent may issue for a gene in a person that bears 
responsibility for breast cancer while the gene remains in the person.  A patent, however, may issue if 
someone isolates the gene and identifies a useful function for it.  The isolated and purified genetic sequence 
does not exist in nature.   
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of the world’s genetic material in its natural state, increasingly assert sovereign 
ownership rights over biological samples containing this material.6   
 
What accounts for this transformation?  Explaining the evolution of property 
rights from open access or global commons regimes to more exclusive ones has long 
presented one of the great challenges to understanding developments in the law.7  This 
long-standing query holds particular importance today.  Nations and societies preserve 
fewer places, spaces and goods as open access or commons property, replacing them 
instead with more exclusive property regimes.8  Over the last several decades, 
knowledge, in particular, has undergone increased propertization, and the trend to expand 
intellectual property rights continues.9  
 
The canonical explanation offered by Harold Demsetz for the evolution of 
property regimes10 is that private property rights emerge when the economic value of a 
                                                          
 
6 Safrin, supra n. 3 at 641.   
 
7 Thomas W. Merrill, Introduction: The Demsetz Thesis and the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL 
STUD. S331 (2002).  See also, Hanoch Dagen and Michael Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L. J. 
549, 560 (2001) (the evolution from commons to private property “remains a puzzle”).   
 
8 On the general expansion of private property at the expense of open access or commons systems, see 
David Bollier, Public Assets, Private Profits: Reclaiming the American Commons in an Age of Market 
Enclosure (2001), available at http://www.bollier.org. 
 
9 See, Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property through a Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE L. J.1 
(2004) (describing how the duration and scope of intellectual property rights have been expanding without 
limit and characterizing the increased propertization of knowledge as revolutionary), Lawrence Lessig, THE 
FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD (2001)  and Edmund W. Kitch, 
Intellectual Property and the Common Law, 78 U. VA. L. REV. 293 (1992) (noting wide agreement that 
intellectual property protection has expanded in recent years).  Legal protection has increased in two 
important ways: the domain of the protected interest has expanded and the nature of the protection 
accorded has expanded.  Wendy Gordon, Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. 
REV. 149, 151-157, 162-163 (1992) (hereinafter, Gordon, Restitutionary Impulse).  See also, Carrier, at 1.  
Patents now extend to innovations that a previous generation considered unpatentable.  These include 
software, living organisms and business methods.  The standards for obtaining a patent have relaxed.  See 
Adam B. Jaffe and Josh Lerner, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 61 (2004).  Patent examiners used to 
operate under the edict that when in doubt they should reject.  Today the operating assumption is when in 
doubt, grant.  Id.  Property rights in the area of copyright have expanded dramatically in duration, scope 
and in the categories of work eligible for protection. See Carrier, id. at 13-16; Gordon, supra n. 9 and 
Eldred v. Ashcroft 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (upholding Congress’s expansion of the copyright term by twenty 
years).  For the expansion of property rights in the area of trademark, see Mark A. Lemley, The Modern 
Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L. J. 1687, 1687-1688 (1999); Robert N. Klieger, 
Trademark Dilution: the Whittling Away of the Rational Basis for Trademark Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 790, 851-863 (1997); David Dante Troutt, A Portrait of the Trademark as a Black Man: Intellectual 
Property, Commodification and Redescription, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV  1141 (2005) & Boston Professional 
Hockey Ass’n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Manufg., 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 
(1975) (applying antidilution doctrine so as to threaten to grant perpetual protection for symbols even when 
their uses causes no confusion as to source or origin).  
 
10 Merrill, supra n. 7 (noting that most efforts to explain the transformation of property rights from open 
access or commons systems to more exclusive ownership regimes begin with Harold Demsetz’s seminal 
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resource changes relative to the costs of controlling it such that it becomes cost-efficient 
to establish a property regime over the resource and to internalize costs or benefits 
previously experienced as externalities.11   Changes in relative value typically occur when 
some external shock, like the introduction of a new technology or the opening or closing 
of particular markets, alters the costs and benefits of the existing property regime.12  
Biotechnology explains the transition of genetic material from open access property to 
private or government property from a Demsetz perspective.13  The introduction of this 
novel technology, which enables the manipulation of genes to create new agricultural, 
therapeutic and other goods, increased the actual or the potential value of the underlying 
genetic material used by the technology.  This increased value engendered the creation of 
property rights over genetic material.14 
 
Yet, one cannot explain the overall evolution of property rights over genetic 
material from an open access or global commons good to a private or government owned 
good by pointing to an increase in its economic value relative to the costs of controlling 
it.  Actual or potential value does not explain today’s extensive property regimes over 
genetic material.  Indeed, the extent of these rights and the costs of establishing and 
maintaining them often exceed the material’s economic value.   As we shall see, the 
Demsetzian account does not adequately explain the rise in property rights in other areas 
as well.   
 
Under the classic Demsetzian account, the emergence of private property rights 
marks a progressive development that should be celebrated because it reflects a society’s 
movement to a more efficient property regime.15  Others have proposed a more sinister 
                                                                                                                                                                             
work, Toward a Theory of Property Rights). Indeed, many, if not most, first year property law courses 
begin with Demsetz’s celebrated work.  See e.g., Jesse Dukeminier and James E. Krier, PROPERTY 41-59 
(5th Ed. 2002).   
 
11 Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 347 (1967).   
Demsetz identified three types of externalities internalized by private property rights.  First, the creation of 
private property rights creates incentives for people to improve the resource in question.  Otherwise, the 
community as a whole would benefit from the individual’s work, creating a free rider problem.  Second, in 
the case of a scarce resource, private property rights can mitigate their depletion, and hence prevent a 
tragedy of the commons.  Third, the creation of private property rights can reduce the number of parties 
who must agree to control spillover effects, such as flooding and pollution.  Property rights can thereby 
facilitate a consensus to address these problems.  Merrill, supra n. 7 at S331-332. 
   
12 Stuart Banner, Transitions Between Property Regimes, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S359 (2002) and Demsetz, 
supra n. 11 at 350.   
 
13 Raustiala and Victor, supra n. 2 at 279, 282-283.  
 
14 Id. (applying Demsetz’s thesis to the evolution of property rights over plant genetic material). 
 
15 Banner, supra n. 12 at S360.  Scholars have criticized Demsetz’s thesis on a number of grounds,.  
Richard A. Posner faults Demsetz for making an unjustified “leap from assuming efficiency maximizing 
behavior of individuals to assuming efficiency-maximizing behavior of a society.”  Richard A. Posner, 
Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 289 (1979) quoted in Dukeminier and 
Krier, supra n. 10 at 57.  Carol Rose and Barry Fried note that while Demsetz criticizes common property, 
he gives short shrift to its virtues.  Dukeminier and Krier, id. at 58.  Finally, others fault Demsetz’s for 
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interest group theory for the emergence of property rights.16  This article suggests that 
instead of the progressive dynamic envisioned by the classic Demsetzian account, a more 
subtle and damaging chain reaction dynamic can come into play that interest group 
theory neither anticipates nor explains.17   This article argues that the establishment and 
the expansion of intellectual and other property rights have an internally generative 
dynamic.  The assertion of or demand for property rights by some engenders the assertion 
of or demand for related property rights by others.  This cycle of increased demands for 
and resulting recognition of property rights may have little to do with the actual or the 
potential value of the resource in question relative to the costs of controlling it.  Rather, 
the creation of property rights itself engenders the demand for additional property rights.  
 
Part I develops this chain reaction theory for the evolution of property by drawing 
upon several case studies: (a) the newly established property regimes over genetic 
material, (b) the recent movement to establish intellectual property rights over traditional 
knowledge, and (c) the dramatic increase in patent activity even though paradoxically the 
expected value of individual patents has diminished, commonly referred to as the patent 
paradox.18    
 
Part II offers three explanations for why property rights evolve in a chain reaction.  
The first two draw upon group behavior theory and focus on social dynamics rather than 
on the kind of economic factors that Demsetz and his followers have emphasized.  The 
third flows from property’s core right – the right to exclude.     
                                                                                                                                                                             
attempting to derive conclusions on property ownership and use “from incomplete historical data on 
primitive societies.”  Dukeminier and Krier, id. at 58 quoting Eric T. Freyfogle, Land Use and the Study of 
Early American History, 94 YALE L.J. 717, 740 N. 73 (1985) and  citing William Cronon, CHANGES IN THE  
LAND (1983).  Despite these criticisms, Demsetz thesis remains the most common starting point for 
understanding why property rights evolve.  Supra n. 10. 
     
16 Saul Levmore points out that for every optimistic efficiency based story about the evolution of property 
rights there exists a pessimistic interest-group based story.  Saul Levmore, Two Stories about the Evolution 
of Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S433 (2002).  For example, Terry Anderson and Peter Hill posit that 
property rights emerge because individuals of superior ability act to capture the economic rents from the 
creation of property rights.  Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill, Cowboys and Contracts, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 
S489 (2002).  According to Stuart Banner, “property rights emerge when powerful oligarchs control both 
the largest share of resources whose value would be maximized by the creation of property and the political 
system through which such a transition is effectuated.”  Banner, supra n. 12 at S359.  Interest group 
theories, for example, appear to best explain Congress’s recent extension of the copyright term by twenty 
years.  Congress seems to have largely bowed to the demands of the Disney Corporation and other 
politically-powerful corporations who stood to gain from the extension.  See generally,  William A. Landes 
and Richard A. Posner,  THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 407-409 
(2003)(describing forces that called for and even drafted the Sony Bono Copyright Extension Act of 1998).    
 
17Interest group theories do not explain, for example, the emergence of property rights over naturally-
occurring genetic material or sui generis intellectual property rights over traditional knowledge, discussed 
below.  Those proposing and promulgating these rights, most notably developing country governments, do 
not constitute interest groups.  
 
18 Gideon Parchomovsky and R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U PA. L. REV. 2, 5, 17 (2005) 
(summarizing the patent paradox).   
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The chain reaction theory for the evolution of property rights yields several 
important insights, which are developed in Part III.  First, the creation of property rights 
in one sphere can trigger unanticipated changes in other property regimes, a phenomenon 
that traditional theories do not usually anticipate nor adequately explain.19   In fact, those 
demanding or creating the initial property rights may even be aghast at the repercussions 
of their actions.  Today’s global economy makes this collateral creation of property rights 
more pronounced because changes in property rights in one country can trigger 
unanticipated changes in the property regimes of another.  Second, the thesis gives new 
importance to first movers in the evolution of property rights precisely because first 
movers may initiate a chain reaction of propertization.  Third, while a change in actual or 
potential value, occasioned by a technological or market breakthrough, may provide the 
impetus for moving toward a property regime, the transition process itself may have little 
to do with value or any cost-benefit calculation.   As a result, the overall resulting 
property regime may not reflect an efficient outcome from a cost-benefit perspective and 
may be worse than the regime that preceded it.   
 
The chain reaction theory for the evolution of property rights has both explanatory 
power and cautionary implication.  It helps explain the emergence of more restrictive 
property regimes and the expansion of existing ones.20  It does not, however, purport to 
explain the transformation of property regimes in all situations or to serve as the 
exclusive explanation for the process through which all property rights evolve.  Other 
theories, like the powerful interest group theories,21 theories that focus on the evolution 
                                                          
19 Some have drawn attention to a “domino” effect that the commoditization of certain goods can have.  
They argue that once market value enters the rhetoric for that good, this rhetoric can contaminate all 
thinking about it.  See generally, Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienablilty, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 
1912-1914 (1987) (describing the domino theory).  This line of reasoning differs from the chain reaction 
dynamic discussed in this article, which envisions property rights in one sphere engendering the creation of 
property rights in a different though related sphere, and is not rhetoric based. 
      
20 Property theorists distinguish between different forms of property regimes that represent a spectrum of 
access accorded to a given resource. These include: open access regimes, commons property regimes, 
state-ownership regimes and private property regimes.  See generally, Dagan & Heller, supra n. 7 at 555-
557.  Open access regimes allow the greatest amount of access.  Open access resources remain available to 
all.  Commons property remains available to all members of a given group.  If that group is sufficiently 
large, the difference between open access and commons resources is slight.  Id.  In state ownership regimes, 
the state owns the resource in question and can provide extensive or little access to the good in question.  
Private property belongs to a given individual or legal person who can generally restrict access.  Dagan and 
Heller, id.  Recently scholars have identified mixed regimes which blend aspects of both commons and 
private property.  See, Robert Heverly, The Information Semicommons, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1127 
(2003) and Henry E. Smith, Semicommons Property Rights and the Scattering in the Open Fields, 29 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 131 (2000). 
 
This article tackles the transition from more open systems of property to more restrictive ones.  While this 
usually involves the evolution of an open access or general commons resource to a private property good, it 
can also involve the movement from an open access good to a more restricted one, such as to a state-owned 
or to a limited commons good. 
  
21 See supra n. 16.  
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of property norms in close-knit communities,22 or those that point to other factors for 
property rights such as the nexus between property and human flourishing,23 may better 
explain the transformation of property in some situations or may operate in conjunction 
with the chain reaction theory in others.  The chain reaction theory is cautionary because 
it shows that once property rights are created, they take on a life of their own and can 
have serious unanticipated consequences.   Therefore, decision-makers, when granting 
new property rights or expanding existing ones, need to take into account the 
reverberation effect of their actions up front.24    
 
Most scholarship on tangible and intangible property, to the extent that the fields 
are considered together, tends to borrow insights from conventional property rights and 
apply these insights to intellectual property.25  The scholarship also focuses on the 
evolution of property in national contexts.  This article, in contrast, uses case studies from 
intellectual property to yield insights into the evolution of property generally, upending 
our usual way of thinking.26  Moreover, it draws upon international developments to shed 
                                                          
22 Some suggest that property rights “emerge as a norm widely shared among members of a close-knit 
community with a strong commonality of interests.” Merrill, supra n. 7at 336 (identifying the norm theory 
and the interest group theories as the two main theoretical clusters for explaining the transformation of 
property rights).  Richard Epstein, for example, points to the emergence of informal exclusion rights to on-
street parking following snowstorms as a situation where a property norm emerges in a neighborhood 
community.  Richard A. Epstein, The Allocation of the Commons: Parking on Public Roads, 31 J. LEGAL 
STUD. S515 (2002).  Robert Ellickson posits that efficient norms emerge in close-knit communities of well-
informed and similarly endowed people.  Robert C. Ellickson, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS 
SETTLE DISPUTES (1991) &  Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L. J. 1315, 1320-1321.  But 
see, Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics and Inefficient Norms. 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697 (1995) (criticizing the 
view that closely knit communities produce efficient norms).   
 
23 Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L REV. 957 (1982) (arguing “that to achieve 
proper self-development … an individual needs some control over resources in the external environment” 
and those “necessary assurances of control take the form of property rights”). 
 
24 The issue of how much property constitutes too much falls outside the scope of this article.   
 
25 See e.g., Carrier, supra n. 9 at 1(arguing that legal limitations on tangible property should apply to 
intellectual property); Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism 
in the Natural law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L. J. 1533 (1993) (applying Lockean tenants of 
property to intellectual property) and Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L. J. 
287 (1988) (applying a range of property theories, including Margaret Jane Radin’s property as personhood 
theory, to intellectual property).   
 
26  The evolution of property rights over both tangible goods and over knowledge involves the same core 
issue of why and how people seek to establish ownership rights over goods.   Stephen R. Munzer, The 
Commons and the Anticommons in the Law and Theory of Property, M.P. Golding and W. A. Edmundson, 
eds, THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 149 (2005).  Moreover, the 
use of case studies from the intellectual property field appears particularly appropriate given that 
intellectual property rights themselves have sufficiently expanded over the last two decades increasingly to 
resemble property rights over tangible goods.  See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and 
Free Riding, 83 TEXAS L. REV. 1031 (2005)(hereinafter, “Free Riding”) (noting that the legal regime for 
intellectual property “increasingly looks like the law of real property”), Carrier, supra n. 9 and Frank H. 
Easterbrook, Intellectual Property is Still Property, 13 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 108, 112 (1990) 
(asserting, inter alia, that the “right to exclude in intellectual property is no different in principle from the 
right to exclude in physical property”).  Furthermore, as demonstrated by the case study below involving 
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art38
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light on a long-standing question in property law that has remained insufficiently 
illuminated in national contexts.  In doing so, it may represent the next frontier in the 
study of international law, namely the use of international developments to help answer 
outstanding questions of general legal concern.27   
 
I.  Three Case Studies of the Chain Reaction Evolution of Property Rights  
 
In a nuclear chain reaction, the splitting of the nucleus of one atom releases 
neutrons which in turn split the nuclei of additional atoms and so on.  In a propertization 
chain reaction, the creation or the expansion of property rights causes individuals to seek 
additional property rights.  Just as the first generation splitting of a nucleus produces 
second generation nucleic splits, the creation of first generation property rights engenders 
the creation of second generation property rights.  These second generation property 
rights often arise in spheres related to but other than the sphere in which the original 
property rights arose and are generally unexpected by decision-makers who created the 
first generation rights.  While the creation of first generation property rights largely find 
explanation and justification in traditional theories for tangible and intangible property 
rights, the second generation property rights that they engender do not.  Unlike first 
generation private property rights, which may reduce tragedies of the commons, address 
resource scarcity, maximize efficiency, encourage investment in the development of the 
resource and, in the intellectual property context, promote innovation and creative works; 
second generation property rights do not accomplish these goals.  This section will 
explore three case studies to illustrate how the chain reaction process works.  The case 
studies show that, whatever the motivation for the creation or the expansion of some 
initial property rights, once these rights are created, another dynamic can kick in. 
 
A.  The Evolution of Property Rights Over Genetic Material 
 
Before Chakrabarty, with the notable exception of certain man-made plants that 
received a limited form of intellectual property protection in a few countries, types of 
living organisms, whether naturally occurring or man-made through traditional breeding, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
genetic material, the line between tangible and intangible goods can blur.  An expansion of intellectual 
property rights over intangible goods like biotechnological innovations can trigger the expansion of 
property rights over tangible or quasi-tangible goods like raw genetic material.    
  
27  Scholars of comparative law and international law often consider the laws of other countries or 
international standards to ascertain best legal practices or emerging norms.  The approach utilized in this 
article, in contrast, does not focus on a particular doctrinal question, such as whether the patent system 
ought to reward the first to file a patent application rather than the first to invent or whether the death 
penalty comports with the norms of  nations comparable to the United States.  Rather, it uses international 
developments to tackle broader legal puzzles.  It thus adds a new realm to those suggested by other 
international law scholars for the innovative use of international law.  See e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, 
International Law and International Relations: A Dual Agenda, 87 AMER. J. INTL. L. 205 
(1995)(suggesting an interdisciplinary approach whereby international relations theorists learn from 
international law and international lawyers learn from international relations theory) and Jeffrey L. Dunoff 
and Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of International Law, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 5 (1999)(applying 
economic theory to international law but also suggesting that international law can inform our 
understanding of law and economics).     
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could not be exclusively owned.  For example, while a person might own a particular 
dog, no one could own a breed of dog.   Moreover, nations treated genetic material as an 
open access resource.28    As with the living resources of the high seas, states did not 
assert sovereignty over genetic material nor did they seek to appropriate it.29  No single 
individual, corporation or nation held an exclusive right to prevent others from using the 
resource generally.30   
 
The Chakrabarty case generated numerous amicus briefs, including several from 
Nobel laureates.31   All knew that if the Supreme Court allowed Dr. Chakrabarty to patent 
his genetically-engineered oil-eating microbe, others would seek to patent and hence 
enjoy property rights over their man-made living creations.  Indeed, in the ten years 
following Chakrabarty’s victory, patents were extended in rapid order to isolated and 
purified genetic sequences,32 to man-made plants,33 and to animals.34   Unanticipated, 
however, was how the propertization of living organisms and their genetic material 
would set off a chain reaction of collateral propertization of unmodified genetic and other 
naturally-occurring biological material.  First, the governments of developing countries 
                                                          
 
28 Supra n. 2. 
 
29 Safrin, supra n. 3 at 644-645 and accompanying footnotes. 
 
30 Id. at 645 and accompanying footnotes. 
 
31 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 316 (noting large number of amicus briefs filed, inter alia, by Nobel laureates).     
 
32  See U.S. Patent No. 4,370,417 (issued Jan. 25, 1983)(covering DNA sequence for plaminogen activator 
protein) and Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991)(upholding a 1987 patent 
on a purified and isolated human DNA sequence encoding Erythropoietin).  The Chakrabarty decision 
swung open the door to the patenting of “anything under the sun made by man.”  In so doing, it created an 
environment favorable to the patenting of genetic sequences provided that they could be deemed man’s 
handiwork.  Earlier cases that allowed the patenting of isolated and purified chemical compounds provided 
the basis for a man’s handiwork determination.  Park-Davis v. Mulford, 189 F. 95, 103 (2nd Cir., 1911),  
upheld a patent on adrenaline, a substance isolated and purified from the adrenal glands of animals.  Judge 
Learned Hand reasoned that no one had ever isolated a similar substance, and the patentee “was the first to 
make [the extract] available for any use by removing it from the other glanal tissue … [whereby] it became 
for every practical purpose a new thing commercially and therapeutically.  Id.   See also, Merck & Co. v. 
Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., 253 F2d 156 (4th Cir. 1958)(upholding a patent on purified Vitamin B-12).  
In Amgen, the Federal Circuit noted that “a gene is a chemical compound, albeit a complex one…”  Amgen, 
927 F.2d at 1206.  The lower court in Amgen explained, “The invention claimed … is not as plaintiff argues 
the DNA sequence encoding human EPO since that is a nonpatentable natural phenomenon ‘free to all men 
and reserved exclusively to no one….’ Rather, the invention as claimed … is the ‘purified and isolated’ 
DNA sequence encoding erythropoietin.”  Amgen Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 12 USPQ 2d (BNA) 
1737 (D. Mass. 1990)(emphasis added).  For a critique of gene patenting, see Eileen M. Kane, Splitting the 
Gene: DNA Patents and the Genetic Code, 71 TENN. L. REV. 707 (2004).      
 
33 Ex Parte Hibbard, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443 (Bd. Pat. App & Interferences 1985)(allowing patent for 
genetically-engineered maize seed).  
 
34 See, e.g., Ex Parte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1425 (Bd. Pat App. & Interferences 1987)(permitting 
patent of a genetically-modified Oyster egg) aff’d, 846 F.2d 77 (Fed. Cir. 1988); U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 
(issued Apr. 12, 1988) (covering a mouse genetically-engineered for susceptibility to cancer, commonly 
known as the “Onco-Mouse”). 
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began to assert sovereign ownership rights over raw genetic material in their countries 
and to restrict access to such material.   Second, patients began to assert property or other 
legal rights in biological specimens, such as blood or tissue samples, that they had 
contributed in the course of receiving medical treatment.  By the turn of the millennium, 
raw biological material increasingly moved from an open access or global commons good 
to a private or government-owned good.   
 
Demsetz’s thesis as well as traditional theories for the granting of intellectual 
property rights explains the actions of those who sought patents over bioengineered 
goods and isolated genetic sequences as well as developed countries’ grant to them of 
these first generation property rights.  The biotechnology revolution offered economic 
reward to those who could isolate genetic sequences and create bioengineered 
innovations.   Chakrabarty and those that supported him sought to establish a property 
interest in their living innovations to capture the economic value of their contributions.  
The United States and most other developed countries extended patent protection to these 
inventions to promote their emerging biotechnology sectors.   
 
Demsetz’s thesis, as well as traditional theories for intellectual or tangible 
property rights, do not adequately explain nor even usually anticipate the second wave of 
propertization:  the emergence of exclusive ownership rights over raw biological 
material.  Granting property rights in naturally-occurring genetic material does not 
encourage innovation.  This material already exists.  Moreover, property rights in raw 
genetic material do not, for example, avoid tragedies of the commons or address resource 
scarcity.  Genetic material is not at risk of overuse, and one need not fell a forest to 
access its genetic material.  While a desire to profit from biological samples may play 
some role in demands both by developing countries and by patients for a property interest 
in their raw biological samples, it leaves much unexplained.  Instead, as shown below, 
these second generation property rights arose in response to the first generation property 
rights.  A tit-for-tat dynamic, rather than a cost-benefit analysis designed to capture the 
actual or potential economic value of raw genetic material, animates the emergence of 
these responsive property rights. 
 
Developing countries harbor the greatest amount of the world’s naturally-
occurring genetic material because they comprise most of the countries which hug the 
equatorial line where the greatest numbers of life forms concentrate.35   Why, these 
countries asked, should individuals and companies from gene-poor developed countries 
obtain genetic material free of charge from gene-rich developing countries when they 
then patent these genes and at times sell them back to the country where the genetic 
material originated?36  Moreover, developing countries faced increasing pressure to 
                                                          
 
35 Columbia University, School of International and Public Affairs,  Access to Genetic Resources: An 
Evaluation of the Development and Implementation of Recent Regulation and Access Agreements 3 
(Environmental Policy Studies Working Paper N. 4, 1999) (unpublished manuscript) available at 
bionet@igc.org (hereinafter Columbia Access Paper).   
 
36 BIODIVERSITY PROSPECTING at 23 (World Resources Institute, 1993).  See generally, Keith Aoki, 
Symposium, Neocolonialism, Anticommons Property, and Biopiracy in the (Not So Brave) New World 
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extend patent protection to man-made living organisms and their genetic material.  In the 
late 1980s, the United States began to require, as a condition of free trade relations, that 
other countries extend intellectual property protection to bioengineered and other 
goods.37  This link between trade and intellectual property rights blossomed in full with 
the 1994 adoption of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (hereinafter, “TRIPs Agreement”) as part of the world trading system.38  The 
TRIPs Agreement required countries to extend intellectual property protection to most 
bioengineered goods or face trade sanctions.39       
 
In response to the propertization of improved genetic material, developing 
countries pressed for the international recognition of sovereign rights over raw genetic 
material in the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (hereinafter, “the CBD”).40   The 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Order of International Intellectual Property Protection, 6 INDIANA JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 11,47  
(1998) (summarizing the objections of Vandana Shiva, Ruth Gana (Okediji), Rosemary Coombe, James 
Boyle, Jack Kloppenberg and others who have written about the “Great Seed Rip-off,” whereby 
international conventions allowed plant breeders to use traditional indigenous varieties of seeds and 
“improve them” via minor genetic alterations without compensating the countries from where those seeds 
originated) and James O. Odek, Bio-piracy: Creating Proprietary Rights in Plant Genetic Resources, 2 J. 
INTELL. PROP. L. 141 (1994)(explaining that developing countries now “passionately” protest the 
prospecting for plant species by scientists from multinational corporations in developing countries’ tropical 
forests who then “protecting their discoveries” through intellectual property rights.  “To developing 
countries, these practices constitute uncompensated exploitation of their ‘plant genetic resources’ in the 
name of intellectual property rights.”) 
 
37 Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International 
Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1,20, 22 (2004); Susan K. Sell, POWER AND IDEAS: 
NORTH-SOUTH POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST (1998), at 132-138 (discussing U.S. 
linkage of trade and intellectual property in bilateral negotiations); G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and 
International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L. J. 829, 843-44 
(1995)(The United States imposed trade sanctions on those countries which did not protect intellectual 
property through section 301, “Super 301” and “Special 301,” all of which were part of the Trade Act of 
1974, as amended in 1988.)  
 
38 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Annex 1C of Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, in WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 321 
(1999).   
 
39 Article 27.  Article 27(3)(b) allows WTO members to exclude animals from patentability. The United 
States, however, has pressed countries to extend such protection through post-TRIPS bilateral agreement, 
commonly referred to as TRIPS-plus agreements.  Genetic Resources Action International (GRAIN), 
“TRIPs-plus” Through the Back Door: How Bilateral Treaties Impose Much Stronger Rules for IPRs on 
Life than the WTO, at 3-4, available at http:www.grain.org/docs/trips-plus-en.pdf (July 2001)(Identifying 
some 23 bilateral and regional agreements requiring intellectual property protection for life forms beyond 
that mandated by the TRIPs Agreement, including with Jordan, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka and 
Vietnam.)   See generally, Peter Drahos, BITs and BIPs, 4  J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. L. 791, 792-807 
(2001)(describing “TRIPs-plus” bilateral agreements between developing countries and the United States 
and the European Community).  
 
40 Article 15(1) of the Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818, 823 (1992) states: 
“Recognizing the sovereign rights of States over their natural resources, the authority to determine access 
to genetic resources rests with the national governments and is subject to national legislation”.  As of 
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art38
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CBD no longer considered genetic resources to form part of “the common heritage of 
mankind,” as had traditionally been the case, but rather to fall within the province of 
sovereigns who would control access to such material.  Since 1993, over forty nations 
have passed or are in the process of passing laws which greatly restrict access to raw 
genetic material in their countries.41    Under these laws, the national government either 
owns all raw genetic material in the country or greatly restricts access to it through a 
multi-layered consent process.42 
 
One can further see the reactive dynamic at play in the history of the International 
Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (“the International 
Undertaking”).  In the 1920s and 1930s, a select number of developed countries began to 
grant plant breeders a limited form of intellectual property rights (commonly referred to 
as plant breeders’ rights) for their new and stable plant varieties.  In 1961, they adopted a 
treaty to provide for these breeders’ rights.43    This marked a change from the traditional 
system where farmers and breeders freely shared their improved varieties with one 
another.44  Developing countries responded to these new property rights by pressing for 
an international agreement that would guarantee that all breeding lines, whether 
traditional or improved, would remain open.45  Eight developed countries refused to join 
this agreement out of concern that it would interfere with plant breeders’ intellectual 
property rights.46    In 1989, these countries succeeded in adding an Annex to the 
International Undertaking, which expressly stated that the Undertaking would not 
compromise breeders’ rights.47  Having failed to maintain an open system, developing 
                                                                                                                                                                             
September 2005, 188 states have ratified or acceded to the convention.  The United States has signed but 
not joined the Convention.  Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, at http://www.biodiv.org .   
 
41 Lyle Glowka, Bioprospecting, Alien Invasive Species, and Hydorthermal Vents: Three Emerging Legal 
Issues in the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Biodiversity, 13 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 329, 330-331 (2000) 
(reporting that ten nations have passed laws greatly restricting access to raw biological, including genetic 
material within their borders).  Since Mr. Glowka’s article, at least two other nations, Brazil and India have 
put access-restricting regimes into place.  At least thirty others are in the process of doing so.  Safrin, supra 
n. 3 at 641, 649. 
 
42 For an analysis of these laws, see Safrin, supra n. 3 at 649-655. 
 
43 1961 International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (hereinafter the UPOV 
Convention) (as amended in 1978 and later in 1991).  Member States to this Convention must grant and 
protect breeders’ rights at the national level for plant varieties that are new, distinct, uniform and stable.  Id. 
at art. 6(1). 
   
44 Raustiala and Victor, supra n. 2 and Fowler, supra n. 2. 
 
45 Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Of Seeds and Shamans: The Appropriation of the Scientific and Technical 
Knowledge of Indigenous and Local Communities, 17 MICHIGAN J. OF INT’L L. 920 (1996). 
 
46 FAO Resolution 4/89, Annex I. 
 
47 Id. 
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countries responded by asserting their sovereign rights over plant genetic material in a 
second Annex, which nations adopted in 1991.48 
  
  While a desire to profit from genetic material partly underlies the development of 
sovereign rights over genetic material,49  conspicuously absent from the years of 
international and national deliberations on arrangements to restrict access to genetic 
material are basic threshold determinations key to a cost-benefit analysis.  One does not 
see, for example, calculations of the demand for raw genetic material as reflected in 
actual levels of bioprospecting activity.  Decision-makers and negotiators also appear 
uninterested in determining the actual supply of genetic material reflected, for example, 
in the extent to which raw genetic material is scarce or widespread.    Missing too are 
estimated costs of establishing and enforcing government ownership regimes.   Why?   
 
The key operating dynamic is that of a tit-for-tat.  Namely, if developed countries 
assert and demand that developing countries recognize intellectual property rights over 
man-made living organisms and isolated and purified genetic sequences, then developing 
countries believe that they should also assert property interests over the raw genetic 
material that may contribute to the patented goods.   Raw genetic material has contributed 
to pharmaceutical innovations and improved crops from time immemorial.  Yet 
sovereigns only asserted ownership rights over this material after the patent system 
recognized private ownership rights over the material and internationalized these property 
rights through pre-TRIPs agreements and eventually through the TRIPs Agreement itself.   
Public statements of developing country leaders also evidence this responsive dynamic.50      
 
Similarly, a cost-benefit analysis designed to capture the actual or the potential 
economic value of raw genetic material does not animate patient demands for a property 
interest or related legal right over contributed tissue samples.  Again, a reactive dynamic 
plays out.  Donors felt that if researchers and corporations obtain property rights by 
patenting cell lines and genetic sequences isolated from tissue samples, than they too 
should claim a property interest in the tissue samples from which those patents sprung.    
 
Moore v. Regents of the University of California represents the most celebrated 
case involving this kind of a property claim.   University of California medical 
researchers freely obtained blood and tissue samples from patient John Moore in the 
course of treating him for hairy-cell leukemia.51    Indeed, for generations, medical 
researchers freely and routinely used biological samples obtained from patients for 
                                                          
48 FAO Resolution 3/91, Annex III (providing that the Undertaking’s heritage of mankind concept was 
“subject to sovereignty of states over their plant genetic resources” and that “nations have sovereign rights 
over their plant genetic resources.”) 
 
49 Those encouraging developing countries to pass legislation restricting access to raw genetic material 
frequently characterized genetic material as “genetic oil” or “genetic gold.”  However, they made no 
serious attempt to back these assertions with facts.  
 
50 See, e.g., Statement of President Ali Hassan Mwinyi of Tanzania, infra p. 28. 
 
51 Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 793 P. 2d 479, 481-482 (Cal. 1990). 
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research.52   In Moore, however, the researches not only developed a stable cell line from 
Moore’s biological materials, they patented that line.53   The Moore case has generated 
scores of law review articles,54 and Moore’s physicians engaged in a series of 
unconscionable and unethical acts for which the California Supreme Court recognized a 
claim for breach of fiduciary duty.55  Few scholars, however, focus on the fact that when 
Moore believed that the medical researchers were using his tissue samples for academic 
and medical research,56 like generations of patients before him,  he did not object to their 
doing so.  He brought suit asserting a property interest in his excised cells only when he 
learned that the researchers had obtained an exclusive property interest, through patent, in 
the cell line derived from him.   He expressed outrage: “What the doctors had done was 
to claim that … my genetic essence was their invention and their property.”57  Moore’s 
assertion of a private property right in his excised tissue arose in response to the 
researchers’ obtainment of a private property right in his cell line.   
 
Although the California Supreme Court refused to recognize Moore’s property 
interest in his excised spleen and other tissue samples, as the patenting of cell lines and 
genetic sequences increased, patients and patient groups continued to seek legal remedy 
when their donated biological material found its way into patented goods.58  In 
Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hospital Research Institute, a group of parents of 
children afflicted with the fatal Canavan disease and several non-profit patient groups 
sued a research physician and his associated medical research institution for unjust 
enrichment.59  For six years, Canavan families contributed blood, urine and autopsy 
                                                          
 
52 Research Involving Human Biological Materials: Ethical Issues and Policy Guidance (National Bioethics 
Advisory Committee, 1999) reprinted in Carl H. Coleman, Jerry A. Menikoff, Jesse A. Goldner & Nancy 
Neveloff Dubler, THE ETHICS AND REGULATION OF RESEARCH WITH HUMAN SUBJECTS (2005) at 701 (“The 
most common sources of human biological material are diagnostic or therapeutic interventions in which 
diseased tissue is removed or tissue or other material is obtained to determine the nature and extent of a 
disease.  Even after the diagnosis or treatment is complete, a portion of the specimen routinely is retained 
for future clinical, research … purposes.”); Arthur La France, BIOETHICS: HEALTH CARE, HUMAN RIGHTS, 
AND THE LAW 495 (1999); Moore, 793 P. 2d  at 494-495 (describing large tissue repositories and the 
widespread free sharing between researchers of human cell lines). 
 
53 U.S. Patent No. 4,438,032 (Mar. 20, 1984). 
 
54 See Alan Hyde, BODIES OF LAW 67-74 (1997) (discussing some of the literature and adding to it). 
 
55 Moore, 793 P.2d at 479. 
 
56 Moore, 793 P. 2d at 486 (The medical researchers had disclosed to Moore that they “were engaged in 
strictly academic and purely scientific medical research ….”) 
 
57 John Moore quoted in Lori B. Andrews, The Gene Patent Dilemma: Balancing Commercial Incentives 
with Health Needs, 2 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 65, 93 (2002). 
 
58 For a discussion of the growing movement to accord donors property rights over genetic material, see 
Gary E. Marchant, Property Rights and Benefit-Sharing for DNA Donors?, 42 JURIMETRICS 153, 159-165 
(2005).  
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samples as well as epidemiological and medical information in an effort to assist 
researchers discover the genes responsible for the disease.60  Using such samples and 
information, the research team successfully isolated the responsible gene.61  This model 
of successful collaboration broke down when the researchers patented the isolated genetic 
sequence.  They thereby “acquired the ability to restrict any activity related to the 
Canavan disease, including … carrier and prenatal testing, gene therapy and other 
treatments … and research involving the gene and its mutations.”62  The donors had 
provided the genetic material and other support in the belief that any genetic tests 
“developed in connection with the research for which they were providing essential 
support would be provided on an affordable and accessible basis, and that the … research 
would remain in the public domain.”63  Upon learning of the researchers’ patent and their 
attempts to enforce it, the furious parents and patient groups sued to establish their own 
legal rights flowing from the materials that they had donated.64  In the words of one 
Canavan parent, our suit “is not about the Canavan families wanting a piece of the pie.”65  
Rather than seeking a share of future royalties, in their complaint, the donors sought to 
prevent the patent holders from restricting access to the Canavan gene and from limiting 
genetic screening tests.66 
 
Taking a different tack to establish a property interest, some donors of biological 
material have insisted on co-ownership of any patents arising from biological materials 
that they contributed.   For example, Sharon Terry, whose two children suffered from the 
debilitating PXE (pseudoxanthorma elasticum) disorder, donated tissue samples and 
began a tissue bank to collect additional samples from other PXE patients.67  In return, 
Terry became a co-owner of the patent for the ultimately isolated PXE gene.68  When 
                                                                                                                                                                             
59 Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hospital Research Institute, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (S.D. Fl. 
2003)(denying defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ claim for unjust enrichment). 
 
60 Id. at 1067.  The patient groups also contributed financially to the endeavor. 
 
61 Id. 
 
62 Id. 
 
63 Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., 208 F. Supp. 2d 918, 921 (N.D. Ill. 2002). 
 
64 The parties settled the case before trial.  The settlement provided for license free use of the patented 
Canavan gene in research and that the plaintiffs would no longer challenge the Hospital’s ownership and 
licensing of the gene patent.  Joint Press Release, Canavan Found. & Miami Children’s Hosp. (Sept. 29, 
2003), available at http://www.canavanfoundation.org/news/09-03_miami.php. 
 
65 Elliot Marshall, Families Sue Hospital, Scientist for Control of Canavan Gene, 290 SCIENCE 1062 
(2000). 
 
66 Id. In particular, the donors sought to block Miami Children’s Hospital’s commercial use of the patented 
gene and strenuously objected to the Hospital’s limitation on the number of tests that could be performed 
by each licensee and its having forced the Canavan Foundation to cease free genetic screening.  Id. 
   
67 Andrews, supra n. 57, at 105. 
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researchers initially asked Sharon Terry for tissue samples from her children, she 
expressed surprise that researchers no longer shared existing samples with each other.69   
Terry and the PXE group that she founded have obtained a property interest in the 
patented gene derived from their donated biological specimens not for economic 
remuneration but rather to ensure that the gene and any resulting genetic tests remain 
available for the benefit of those who suffer from PXE.70 
 
As Gary Marchant notes, it matters little whether the law automatically accords 
property rights in genetic material if donors insist on such rights as a matter of contract.71  
The Canavan case as well as the PXE precedent pave the way for property rights in 
genetic material through contract.  Indeed, several patient advocacy groups for genetic 
diseases appear to be pursuing a PXE model for the sharing of genetic material, whereby 
groups of tissue donors obtain property rights in donated DNA samples.72    
 
In all of the cases discussed above, donors sought to establish a property or 
related legal interest in material that in a previous generation they would have freely 
made available, each in reaction to the assertion of or threatened assertion of a property 
interest by others.  But for society’s willingness to recognize a patent right in isolated 
genetic sequences and cell lines, neither Moore nor Greenberg would have brought suit 
nor would PXE patient advocates likely have pressed for co-ownership of patents. 
 
B.  Property Rights in Traditional Knowledge 
 
Most knowledge that we use is both traditional and free.  It consists of human 
innovation and insight developed over millennia and passed down from generation to 
generation.  A child born today will benefit from language that she made no contribution 
to creating.  She will use numbers and a system of mathematics for free.  She will enjoy 
food, songs and dances developed by generations long gone.  She will inherit a range of 
methodologies from the tying of shoelaces to the manipulation of a range of tools and 
objects.   We take the free availability of most information as a given.  No one thinks to 
thank the Chinese, let alone pay a royalty to China, whenever eating pasta.  Mexico holds 
no intellectual property right in the widespread use of aloe vera in soaps and moisturizers.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
68 Id. and Paul Smaglik, Tissue Donors Use Their Influence in Deal over Gene Patent Terms, 407 NATURE 
821 (2000)(researchers who want to use the samples in the PXE International blood and tissue bank must 
agree to the PXE group’s terms, which include joint ownership of any resulting intellectual property rights). 
 
69 Andrews, , supra n. 57, at 105 
 
70 Id. and Smaglik, supra n. 68.  See also, Elliot Marshall, Patient Advocate Named Co-Inventor on Patent 
for the PXE Disease Gene, 305 SCIENCE 1226 (2004).  
 
71 Marchant, supra n. 58 at 163. 
 
72 Id. at 164 and Donna M. Gitter, Ownership of Human Tissue: A Proposal for Federal Recognition of 
Human Research Participants’ Property Rights in Their Biological Material, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 257, 
318-19 (2004).  See e.g., Genetic Alliance Biobank at http://www.gabiobank.org. 
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Our use of Arabic numerals generates no royalties for Arab nations nor do parents pay a 
royalty to Israel whenever they name a child Jacob or Hannah. 
 
Yet, today many nations demand the development of intellectual property regimes 
to cover “traditional knowledge.”73  A flurry of international activity has materialized on 
this issue.  In 2000, the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) established 
an intergovernmental committee to address the protection of traditional knowledge, 
innovations and creativity, and expressions of folklore.74   In 1999, the Parties to the CBD 
established a working group to address traditional knowledge issues, 75 and the 1992 
CBD itself exhorts nations to respect and protect traditional knowledge.76  The CBD 
working group has met four times and numerous regional and experts meetings have 
convened on the topic as well.77   Even the WTO has taken up the issue, calling upon the 
TRIPs Council “to examine … the protection of traditional knowledge and folklore.”78  A 
study by WIPO indicated that the majority of countries surveyed believe in the need for 
an international agreement for the protection of expressions of folklore.  Several nations, 
such as Brazil and Panama, have already enacted measures purporting to protect 
traditional knowledge.79 
 
What has occurred to cause nations to demand the extension of intellectual 
property rights to tradition?   Anthropologist Michael Brown observes that “[i]n the late 
                                                          
73 Nations have yet to agree on a consistent definition of traditional knowledge.  The World Intellectual 
Property Organization has defined traditional knowledge as “tradition-based literary, artistic or scientific 
works; performances; inventions; scientific discoveries; designs; marks, names and symbols; undisclosed 
information; and, all other tradition-based innovations and creations resulting from intellectual activity in 
the industrial, scientific, literary or artistic fields.”  WIPO,  Intellectual Property Needs and Expectations of 
Traditional Knowledge Holders, Report on Fact-finding Missions on Intellectual Property and Traditional 
Knowledge (1998-1999) (2001) at 25, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/globalissues/tk/report/final/pdf/part1.pdf.    
 
74 http://www.wipo.int/globalissues/igc/index.html.  
 
75 Decision of the Fourth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, Brataslava, 1999.   
 
76 CBD, supra n. 40, Art. 8(j). 
 
77  See http://www.biodiv.org/programmes/socio-eco/traditional/meetings.shtml.  The working group met in 
2000, 2002, 2003 and 2006. 
 
78 Ministerial Declaration P 19, WTO Document No. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (Nov. 14,2001), available at 
http:www.wto.org/english/thewto e/min01 e/mindecl e.doc. 
 
79 World Intellectual Property Organization, Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and 
Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, Third Session, Geneva, June 12-21, 2002.  Final 
Report on National Experiences with the Legal Protection of Folklore, at 47. Panama Regulating Law No. 
20 of June 26, 2000 on the Special Intellectual Property Regime Governing the Collective Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples for the Protection and Defense of their Cultural Identity and their Traditional 
Knowledge and Brazil Provisional Measure No. 2.186-16 of August 23, 2001.  See also, Peru Law No. 
27811 Introducing a Protection Regime for the Collective Knowledge of Indigenous Peoples Derived from 
Biological Resources (August 10, 2002).  These statutes can be found in WIPO/GRTKF/IC/INF/2, Annex 
III. 
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1980’s, ownership of knowledge and artistic creations traceable to the world’s indigenous 
societies emerged, seemingly out of nowhere, as a major social issue.”80    However, 
something did happen in the late 1980’s that likely engendered such demands: the 
internationalization of intellectual property.   In the late 1980s, the United States began to 
impose trade sanctions against countries that accorded little or no protection to U.S. 
intellectual property goods, pursuant to a new U.S. law called “Special Clause 301”.81  As 
mentioned earlier, the United States also made trade with it conditioned upon the granting 
of intellectual property rights in a number of bilateral agreements.82   Moreover, in 1986 
and 1987, the United States and the European Union linked intellectual property and 
trade in the negotiating mandate for the Uruguay Round of the GATT.83  The 1994 
adoption of the TRIPs Agreement, which emerged from the Uruguay Round, required 
countries to put in place, as a condition of participating in the world trading system, 
copyright, patent, trademark and trade secret laws.84  Beginning in the late 1980s, 
developing countries were forced to extend a host of intellectual property protection to a 
vast range of knowledge that had hitherto remained free in their countries.  They 
responded to these first generation intellectual property rights by demanding in numerous 
international fora the development of second generation intellectual property rights which 
would propertize traditional knowledge generated in their countries that had previously 
remained open. 
 
One can see this nexus between the internationalization of western intellectual 
property protection and the movement to propertize traditional knowledge in multiple 
contexts.  For example, developing countries strongly object to the requirement that they 
extend patent protection to pharmaceutical goods.85  This requirement appeared in several 
                                                          
 
80 Michael F. Brown, WHO OWNS NATIVE CULTURE? at ix (2003)(emphasis added). 
 
81 1988 U.S. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act; Kim Newby, The Effectiveness of Special 301 in 
Cheating Long Term Copyright Protection for U.S. Companies Overseas, 21 SYRACUSE J. INT’L & COM. 
29, 32-62 (1995) and Shell, supra n. 37 at 843-44.  Under this clause, the United States imposed trade 
sanctions on a number of developing countries, including Argentina, Brazil and China.  Remigius N. 
Nwabueze, Symposium: Patents and the Politics of Plants’ Genetic Resources, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 585, 592 (2003).  The U.S. Trade Representative also identified India, Japan and Thailand as 
either priority countries or on the priority watch list for trade sanctions due to inadequate protection of 
intellectual property.  Peter K. Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents in the International Intellectual Property 
Regime, 38 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 323, 361-62 (2004). 
 
82 Susan K. Sell, POWER AND IDEAS: NORTH-SOUTH POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST 
(1998), at 132-138 (discussing U.S. linkage of trade and intellectual property in bilateral negotiations) 
 
83 Helfer, supra, n. 37, at 20-21. 
 
84 TRIPs Agreement, supra n. 38.  As of February 2006, 149 nations have joined the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and are hence bound by the TRIPs Agreement.   See www.wto.org. 
 
85 See e.g., Nadia Natasha Seeratan, Comment, The Negative Impact of Intellectual Property Patent Rights 
on Developing Countries: An Examination of the Indian Pharmaceutical Industry, 3 Scholar 339, 347 
(2001); Amit Sen Gupta, Indian Patent Act-Jeopardizing the Lives of Millions, http://phm-
india.org/issues/patents/indianpatentact.thml (June 22, 2005); Prasanna Aligrma, The Indian Patents 
Amendment Bill – the Silent Tsunami, http;testing.aidindia.org  (characterizing TRIPs implementing 
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pre-TRIPs bilateral agreements, and the TRIPs Agreement mandates such protection.86   
In turn, developing country demands for the extension of intellectual property protection 
to traditional knowledge often concern the protection of folk remedies.87    
 
Developing countries also strongly object to the extension of intellectual property 
protection to plants.  While most developed countries eventually joined the UPOV 
Agreement that required countries to extend intellectual property protection to new plant 
varieties, prior to the adoption of the TRIPs Agreement, virtually no developing countries 
had joined.88   As developed countries successfully pressed for property rights over plants 
through the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, pre-TRIPS bilateral 
pressure and finally through TRIPs Agreement itself, developing countries reacted by  
demanding new legal protection for the traditional contributions of farmers and farming 
communities who had improved crops over generations.  Thus, they responded to the 
added Annex to the International Undertaking that accommodated Plant Breeders’ 
property rights89 with the addition of an Annex calling for the recognition of “Farmers’ 
Rights.”   Farmers’ Rights recognized the historical and continued contribution of 
farmers to the development of crops.90  
  
 In response to requirements that developing countries extend copyright protection 
to artistic works, these countries now demand that some kind of property right extend to 
traditional songs and dances that originated in their countries.  Indeed, furor over the use 
of traditional folklore like dance and song often erupt when a western artist obtains a 
copyright on a product that incorporates folklore.  For example, the German singer 
Enigma’s incorporation of the native Taiwanese Song of Joy into his copyrighted song 
Return to Innocence generated uproar, even though a group of native Taiwanese had 
                                                                                                                                                                             
legislation as a “tsunami”) and Global Coalition Against the Indian Patent Amendment, 26 February , 
Global Day of Action Against ‘TRIPs+, “ the Indian Patent Ordinance , Feb. 9, 2005, http:www.health-
now.org/site/article.php (describing extensive protests against TRIPs conforming amendments in the 
pharmaceutical area).   See generally, Martin J. Adelman, et. al., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW, 
2D at 60 (2003) (many developing countries did not extend patent protection to drugs and widely 
manufactured them.  The TRIPs agreement was of great importance of TRIPs for the pharmaceutical 
industry); Martin J. Adelman & Sonia Badia, Prospects and Limits of the Patent Protection in the TRIPS 
Agreement: The Case of India, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 507, 534, 532 (1996).  
 
86 Art. 27 of TRIPs Agreement.  Badia and Adelman, id. and Adelman, id.   
 
87 See e.g., Dr. Gerard Bodeker, Traditional Medical Knowledge, Intellectual Property Rights & Benefit 
Sharing, 11 CARDOZO JOURNAL OF INT’L & COMP. L. 785 (2003); Michael J. Huft, Indigenous Peoples and 
Drug Discovery Research: A Question of Intellectual Property Rights, 89 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1678, 1700 
(1995)(discussing how the anti-malarial drug quinine derived from the bark of South American Cinchona 
trees was first used by the indigenous peoples of Peru)  and Shayana Kadidal, Note, Plants, Poverty, and 
Pharmaceutical Patents, 103 YALE L. J. 223 (1993). 
 
88 Roht-Arriaza, supra n. 45 at footnote 114. 
 
89 Supra n. 46. 
 
90 FAO Resolution, Annex II.  The Annex on Farmer Rights was in addition to the Annex on Sovereign 
Rights discussed earlier. 
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publicly performed the song in music halls across Europe.91  Though now settled, the 
incident would engender even greater consternation today now that China and Taiwan 
must grant copyright protection to Enigma’s song pursuant to the TRIPs Agreement.92  
 
Even the language used by those demanding the creation of intellectual property 
rights over traditional knowledge indicates the relationship between the 
internationalization of intellectual property and the demand to fashion new intellectual 
property rights to cover traditional knowledge.  Developed countries and their companies 
repeatedly had decried the widespread copying of western drugs, movies, songs and 
software as “piracy.”93  Mimicking such characterization, those advocating the creation 
of property rights over traditional knowledge reciprocally characterize the 
uncompensated use of traditional knowledge as “piracy.”94   
 
While the national governments of developing countries respond to the 
internationalization of intellectual property by demanding new forms of intellectual 
property, the demands by indigenous groups for the protection of their traditional 
knowledge, while sometimes reactive to western intellectual property, can stem from 
other concerns.  For example, indigenous groups sometimes seek to protect and control 
knowledge that they consider sacred or private.95  They may also seek to prevent persons 
from fraudulently depicting an item as an authentic native craft.   Addressing these 
concerns, however, does not require the creation of new property rights but can be met 
with legislation that prohibits certain bad acts.96     
                                                          
91 The performances were at the behest of the Chinese and French Cultural Ministries. Angela Riley, 
Recovering Collectivity: Group Rights to Intellectual Property in Indigenous Communities, 18 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 175, 177 (2000). 
 
92 China and Chinese Taipei (Taiwan) joined the WTO on December 11, 2001 and January 1, 2002, 
respectively. 
 
93  See  e.g., Special 301 and the Fight Against Trade Piracy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On 
International Trade of the Comm. on Finance, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1993); Newby, supra  n 74 at 
footnotes 91-93 and at p. 52 (citing  the Business Software Alliance estimates “that software piracy in 
China  costs U.S. industry $322 million each year and … that there is a 94% software piracy rate in that 
country” and statements by music industry members objecting to American creativity being “pirated” 
“counterfeited” or “ripped off”); and Jon Newton “Movie Studios Poised for Piracy Fight” (Aug 30, 2005) 
at http://www.technewsworld.com/story/45777.html. 
 
94 See e.g., James Boyle, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE AND SPLEENS 121, 126, n. 14  (1996) and Vandana Shiva, 
BIOPIRACY: THE PLUNDER OF NATURE AND KNOWLEDGE (1997). 
 
95 Christine Haight Farley, Protecting Folklore of Indigenous Peoples: Is Intellectual Property the 
Answer?, 30 U. CONN. L. REV. 1, 13 (1997). See e.g., Brown, supra n. 80 at 11-42.  See also, Daniel J. 
Gervais, Spiritual But not Intellectual? The Protection of Sacred Intangible Traditional Knowledge, 11 
CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 467 (2003). 
   
96 See, e.g., The U.S. Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990, codified at 25 U.S.C. Sec. 305(a)(2000), which 
prohibits the representation of a work as a native craft when it is not and provides for criminal and civil 
penalties for such misrepresentation.  For a description of the Act and its history, see, Roberto Iraola, The 
Civil and Criminal Penalties of the Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990, 36 CUMB. L. REV. 293 (2006). 
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Demsetz’s thesis largely explains why developed countries have in the last several 
decades greatly expanded intellectual property rights both in their countries and around 
the world.  As the economies of these countries came increasingly to depend less on the 
manufacture of articles and more on the generation of innovative drugs, movies, 
software, music and other intellectual property goods, they stood to gain by developing 
property rights that would enable their corporations and citizens to capture the 
commercial value of these goods.97   As with the emergence of property rights over raw 
genetic material, Demsetz’s thesis does not explain the sudden demand by developing 
countries for ownership rights in tradition.  Traditional knowledge did not suddenly 
become commercially valuable in the late 1980s.  Communities that generated such 
knowledge and those that interacted with them had always used this knowledge and 
applied it in commercial ways.  Classic explanations for intellectual property also fail to 
explain this development.  According intellectual property protection to tradition does not 
encourage new works.   These works already exist.  In fact, granting these rights can 
hinder the development of new works because people can no longer draw upon as rich a 
public domain.  Moral rights justifications also have little explanatory purchase because 
the people who created the traditional works are long gone.   Instead, the demand by 
developing countries for the creation of property rights over traditional know-how 
primarily arose in reaction to the worldwide expansion of western intellectual property 
rights.  The internationalization of intellectual property began a chain reaction of 
propertziation that not only encompassed new technologies and creative works but also 
innovations and expressions existent for centuries. 
 
C.  The Patent Paradox 
 
One can see the chain reaction dynamic operating, though in a different way, in 
the so-called patent paradox.  The patent paradox constitutes one of the most puzzling 
phenomena of today’s patent activity.  In the United States, as well as in other countries, 
the amount of patent activity has risen dramatically even though, paradoxically, the 
expected value of individual patents has diminished.98   Patent filings generally rose by 
about forty percent between 1993 and 2003. 99   In addition, patent intensity - the measure 
of patents obtained per research and development dollar - nearly doubled from the mid-
1980’s to the late 1990s.100 Meanwhile, empirical research indicates the low average 
expected value of the overwhelming majority of patents.101  Empirical studies set the 
                                                          
97 See e.g., Susan K. Sell, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS 8 (Cambridge, 2003)(discussing how private corporations were the main proponents for 
stronger intellectual property protection in the TRIPs Agreement). 
 
98 Parchomovsky and Wagner, supra n. 18 at 2,5. 
   
99 Id. at 5, n. 2. 
  
100 Id. citing A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 20TH CENTURY 30 (Stephen A. Merrill, Richard C. Levin & Mark 
B. Myers, eds, 2004). 
 
101 Id. at 13. 
 
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art38
21 
average value of patents at $7,500-$25,000.102  This generally represents less than their 
average acquisition costs, which conservatively run $10,000-$30,000 per patent 
prosecuted in the United States and several times that for inventions prosecuted in 
multiple countries.103  Estimates suggest that less than one percent of patents are litigated, 
of which courts deem almost half invalid, and only a small additional number are 
licensed.104  Strikingly, most patentees view their patents to hold so little value that they 
let them lapse before the end of their term rather than pay the periodic maintenance 
fees.105   
 
Scholars have offered several theories to explain why so many seek patents, 
notwithstanding the low expected value of the overwhelming majority of them.  These 
include (a) the lottery theory,  which likens each patent to a potential winning lottery 
ticket;106 (b) the signaling theory, which suggests that firms secure patents to provide 
information to outside investors;107 (c) the internal metric theory, which posits that 
                                                          
102 Id. at 5, n. 3; Mark Schankerman, How Valuable is Patent Protection?  Estimates by Technology Field, 
29 RAND. J. OF ECON 93 (2001)(concluding that “most patents have very little private value” with the 
median private value of patent rights, in 1980 dollars, amounting to only $1,631 in the pharmaceutical 
industry, $1,594 in the chemical field, $2,930 in the mechanical field, and $3,159 in electronics (but 
excluding Japan). 
 
103 Kimberley A. Moore, Worthless Patents, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1521, 1526 ( 2005) and 
Parchomovsky and Wagner, supra n. 18, at 15 citing Erwin F. Berrier, Jr, Global Patent Costs Must Be 
Reduced, 36 IDEA 473, 476-77(1996)(estimating cost of obtaining protection in ten European countries at 
over $95,000). 
     
104 Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1507 
(2001)(hereinafter “Rational Ignorance”). 
  
105 Moore, supra n. 103.  (53.71% of patentees allow their patents to expire for failure to pay maintenance 
fees).  Maintenance fees in the United States are $830 at three and a half years, $1900 at seven and a half 
years, and $2910 at eleven and a half years.  35 U.S.C. Sec. 41(b)(2003).  This trend appears in other 
countries as well.  A study of French and German patents showed that only 7% of the former and 11% of 
the latter were maintained until their expiration date.  Ariel Pakes, Estimates of the Value of Holding 
European Patent Stocks 54 ECONOMETIRCA 755, 774 (1986)(study covered over a million French patents 
applied for between 1951 and 1979 and approximately 500,000 German patents issued between 1952 and 
1979) cited in Parchomovsky and Wagner, supra n. 18 at n. 49.  See also, Jean Lanjouw, Patent Protection 
in the Shadow of Infringement: Simulation Estimates of Patent Value, 65 REV. ECON. STUD. 671, 693 
(1998) cited in Parchomovsky and Wagner, id .Lanjouw’s study of a sample of German patents filed 
between 1953 and 1988 showed that less than 50% of the patents were maintained for over ten years and 
less than 35% were maintained until the statutory expiration date. 
 
106 Individuals and corporations obtain patents in the hope that one of them will turn into a winning lottery 
ticket. Because they cannot know in advance which of their patents will ultimately prove the winner, they 
patent everything.  F.M. Scherer, The Innovation Lottery, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE Society 3, 11 (Rochelle Cooper 
Dreyfuss, et. al., eds., 2001) (showing that a minority of “spectacular winners appropriate the lion’s share 
of” patent rewards).   
 
107 The signaling theory suggests that patents provide cheap valuable information about the invention or 
firm to, for example, potential investors.   See Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625 (2002).    
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patents provide a means to measure employee performance;108 and (d) the patent portfolio 
theory, which argues that patents of little individual worth become valuable when 
bundled together in a portfolio.109  Each of these theories helps explain the patent 
paradox.  
 
The chain reaction theory adds to these hypotheses by suggesting that today 
people and corporations also seek patents because others have done so.  Patent activity 
begets patent activity.  The frenzy to obtain patent rights over genetic fragments 
illustrates this copycat behavior.    In June of 1991, Dr. Craig Venter, on behalf of the 
National Institutes of Health (NIH), applied for patents on some 2,700 gene fragments of 
unknown function that he had sequenced using automated sequencing methods.110  These 
new sequencing methods enabled the rapid identification of thousands of genetic 
fragments per month.111  NIH’s attempt to patent and hence control a large quantity of 
genetic material whose function it had not identified was unprecedented.   Academics and 
industry groups immediately and harshly denounced its action, and uncertainty existed as 
to whether the PTO would even issue patents on such gene fragments.112    Despite these 
criticisms, legal uncertainty and the enormous expense of preparing and filing patent 
applications, once word of NIH’s applications got out, the lemmings began their march.  
Applications covering hundreds of thousands of genetic fragments began to pour into the 
PTO.   By 1996, Incyte Pharmaceuticals alone had filed patent applications covering 
400,000 genetic fragments.113  Many of these applications extended over 2000 pages.114  
This immense flood of patent application activity confronted the PTO with a 90-year 
backlog.115   Widespread criticism caused NIH to eventually withdraw its original and 
subsequent applications.116   NIH’s applications, however, had already initiated a chain 
                                                          
108 See Richard C. Levin, A New Look at the Patent System, 76 AMER. ECON. REV. 199, 200-201 (1986) and 
Wesley M. Cohen, Richard R. Nelson and John P. Walsh, PROTECTING THEIR INTELLECTUAL ASSETS: 
APPROPRIABILITY CONDITIONS AND WHY U.S. MANUFACTURING FIRMS PATENT (OR NOT) 35 (Nat’l Bureau 
of Econ. Research, Working Paper N. 7552, 2000).  In this connection it bears noting that even universities 
evaluate professors on the number of patents that they have received.   See, e.g., Rutgers University, Form 
1-A (evaluating professors for promotion and tenure in part on the number of patents that they have 
received).    
 
109 Parchomovsky and Wagner, supra 18 at 1.  For a discussion of the strengths and the limits of most of 
these theories, see Parchomovsky and Wagner, id. at 19-27. 
     
110 Arti K. Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 
NW U. L. REV. 77, 99 (1999). 
 
111  Molly A. Hollman & Stephen Munzer, Intellectual Property Rights in Genes and Gene Fragments: A 
Registration Solution for Expressed Gene Tags, 85 IOWA L. REV. 735, 750 (2000). 
  
112 Id. 
 
113 Elliot Marshall, Patent Office Faces 90-Year Backlog, 272 SCIENCE 643 (1996). 
     
114 Hollman & Munzer, supra n. 111 at 754. 
 
115 Marshall, supra. n 113.     
 
116 Hollman & Munzer, supra n. 111 at 751. 
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reaction.  Thousands of applications continued to pour into the PTO, notwithstanding 
NIH’s withdrawals.  
 
The increasingly widespread use of defensive patenting, which scholars have 
identified as a factor contributing to today’s high levels of patent activity, further 
evidences a chain reaction dynamic.117  Corporations and individuals obtain patents for 
maintenance in a patent arsenal.  Should someone sue or threaten to sue a corporation for 
patent infringement, the corporation counter-sues or threatens to counter sue for 
infringement of one of the patents that it has warehoused in its arsenal.  The corporations 
hope that, in the face of this actual or threatened lawsuit, the plaintiff will dismiss its suit, 
and each corporation will return to business as usual.  In the alternative, the corporation 
uses patents in its arsenal to cross-license its technology with other corporations.118  Each 
corporation thereby avoids litigation.  The ultimate outcome does not much differ from a 
situation where neither corporation had obtained the patents at issue.  
 
The defensive patenting scenario currently affects several important industries.  
These include the semiconductor industry,119  which accounts for some nine percent of all 
issued patents.120   It also includes the computer software industry, which receives at least 
five percent of issued patents, as well as the computer hardware sector.121   Some fear that 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
117 Fed. Trade Comm’n, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT 
LAW AND POLICY (2003)(hereinafter FTC Report) at 3-33 (describing use of defensive patenting); Cohen, 
Nelson and Walsh, supra n. 108 at 17 (explaining that one of the reasons why firms patent inventions is to 
prevent infringement lawsuits and identifying defensive patenting as a primary factor causing the increase 
in patent activity, despite the fact that research and development executives do not perceive patents to be 
one of the best means of obtaining returns on their research and development investment); John H. Barton, 
Reforming the Patent System, 287 SCIENCE 1933 (2000) (describing how firms try to protect themselves 
from patent infringement lawsuits by assembling patent portfolios – frequently on very minor inventions – 
“so they can deter litigation through the threat of reciprocal suit.”). 
  
118 Jaffe and Lerner, supra n. 9 at 61. 
 
119 Bronwyn H. Hall & Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox Revisited: An Empirical Study of 
Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 1979-95, 32 RAND J. ECON 101, 105-107, 109, 125 (2001); 
Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, Patent Litigation in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, in PATENTS  IN THE 
KNOWLDEGE-BASED ECONOMY 180, 188-189, 208 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill, eds., 2003);  
John H. Barton, Antitrust Treatment of Oligopolies with Mutually Blocking Portfolios 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 
851, 855 (2002) (describing how in the semiconductor industry, companies amass patent portfolios for 
defensive purposes).   
 
120 John R. Allison and Mark Lemley, Who’s Patenting What?  An Empirical Exploration of Patent 
Prosecution, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2099, table 1 (2000) (finding that semiconductor patents accounted for 
9.3% of all patents issued in the period that they studied). 
 
121  FTC report, supra n. 117  (many companies in the semiconductor, computer hardware and computer 
software industries have responded to the risk of “unintentional and sometimes unavoidable” patent 
infringement litigation by filing hundreds of patent applications each year, which they “can use defensively 
against firms threatening infringement actions.” See also id. at Exec. Summary at 6-7 (“computer hardware 
and software contain an incredibly large number of incremental innovations…As more and more patents 
issue on incremental innovations, firms seek more and more patents to have enough bargaining chips to 
obtain access to each others’ overlapping patents.”)  Carlos M. Correa, The Internationalization of the 
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the biotechnology industry risks falling into a defensive patenting dynamic.122   In the 
defensive patenting world in which these industries operate, patent activity occurs in 
response to prior patent activity.  In chain reaction fashion, one patent begets another 
which begets another still and so on.   Individuals, research institutions and corporations 
obtain these reactive patents not because of the patents’ potential positive value, such as 
their ability to generate license revenue or to provide a manufacturer with a competitive 
edge, but rather because others in their field have obtained patents or might do so.123  
Commentators consistently liken the situation to an arms race, the quintessential example 
of a wasteful tit-for-tat, rather than to an enterprise designed to promote innovation by 
capturing the actual or the potential value of technological advances. 
     
II. Explanations for the Chain Reaction Evolution of Property Rights 
 
Why do individuals, corporations and nations respond to the development or 
expansion of property rights by demanding the creation of or pursuing additional property 
rights?  Three explanations follow. 
  
A. Group Behavior Theory: The Imitation Impulse  
 
In sandboxes and playgrounds throughout the world, one can observe the 
following dynamic.   A toy sits in a corner untouched.  It is commons property.  Children 
know that the toy is available for the use of all and subject to the exclusive use of no one.  
Hours go by.  Not a child shows the slightest interest in the object.  Suddenly, one child 
begins to play with the toy.  Within minutes, other children gather.  A fight frequently 
ensues as the children now battle over something that they showed no interest in some 
fifteen minutes earlier.124  Why?   
 
Why does a song suddenly become popular?  Why do people join a standing 
ovation, even if they experienced the performance as mediocre or bad?  Imitation is an 
important and powerful social phenomenon, as has been demonstrated by numerous 
studies in zoology, sociology and social psychology.125  Group behavior theorists 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Patent System, 20 WISC. INTL. L. J. 523, 539 (2002)(citing study that showed that software patents 
accounted for 5% of all patents issues by 2000).   Allison and Lemley found that computer-related 
technology, which includes software, accounted for 16% of issued patents in the random sample that they 
studied.  Who’s Patenting What?, supra  n. 120 at 1500. 
  
122 See, Barton, Science, supra n. 117. 
 
123 Supra, n. 119 and n. 121. 
  
124 I am grateful to Professor Ellen Goodman for pointing to the sandbox dynamic. 
 
125  S. Bikhchandani, D. Hirshleifer, I. Welch. A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as 
Information Cascades, 100 J. POLIT ECON 992, 995 (1992).  See also, G. S. Berns, J. Chappelow, C. F. 
Zink, G Pagnoni, M.E. Martin-Skurski, and J. Richards, Neurobiological Correlates of Social Conformity 
and Independence During Mental Rotation, BIOL. PSYCHIATRY 1 (2005) (identifying a neurobiological 
basis for social conformity which indicates that individuals follow others even when the group is wrong 
because the group alters their perception rather than because they consciously decide to capitulate). 
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Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch show that decision-makers at some point will 
ignore their own information and pattern their behavior on the actions of those before 
them. 126  This phenomenon, which they call an information cascade, explains why 
societies converge on a norm and, on the basis of little information, will systematically 
make dubious choices.  Their models demonstrate that information cascades both will 
eventually occur and often will result in imprudent outcomes.127 
 
Building on this work, John Miller and Scott Page recently tackled the standing 
ovation problem.  They summarize the problem as follows: A theater performance ends.  
The audience begins to applaud.  The applause builds up tentatively and a few audience 
members stand.  “Does a standing ovation ensue or does the enthusiasm fizzle?”128   
Using computational models, Miller and Page found that the system often converged on 
the wrong equilibrium.   Most people stood even though most did not like the 
performance.129   They also discovered that greater pressure to conform led to less 
efficient aggregation of information.  In addition, they found that people sitting in the 
front had a large impact as almost everyone patterned their behavior off them.130 
 
Many situations fall prone to a group behavior dynamic.  Mass communication, 
international travel and the prodigious amount of international negotiations and number 
of international organizations mean that people and countries quickly learn of and are 
influenced by developments occurring in other places.  Governments rapidly know of 
legal developments in other countries, and international negotiations take place in a face-
to-face environment with attendant group dynamic pressures.  Corporations readily learn 
of each others patenting activity.  One no longer needs to scour government document 
depositories to find patents.  Several clicks on the PTO website yield a bounty of 
information, and newspapers routinely report patenting trends.131  Corporations, research 
institutions, nations and individuals know more than ever before what each other are up 
to and have greater susceptibility to copycat group behavior dynamics.  
 
Group behavior theory helps explain why property rights evolve in a chain 
reaction.  Some individuals begin to assert a property interest in a good.  Others cue their 
                                                          
126 Id. at 1004 
 
127 Id. at 1016. 
 
128 John H. Miller, Scott E. Page, The Standing Ovation Problem, 9 COMPLEXITY 8 (May/June 2004). 
 
129 Id. at 15. 
  
130 Id.  In addition to these socially demonstrated models of lemming-like behavior, a scientific theory of 
imitation argues that humans behave like atoms.  Two French scientists recently noted that atoms influence 
each other in their directions and interactions.   They found that “the way collections of atoms behave often 
depends only very weakly on the precise details of how the individual atoms interact with one another.”  
Directing their observations to the social world, these scientists concluded that imitation basically 
exaggerates any collective social response to real world trends.  In other words, “imitation leads to 
distortion.”  Mark Buchanan, Bubble Physics, The Boston Globe (Aug 7, 2005) available at 
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/ideas/articles/2005/08/07/bubble_physics/ . 
 
131 See, e.g., Floyd Norris, You Can’t Use that Tax Idea. It’s Patented, NY TIMES, Oct. 20, 2006. 
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behavior off of these initial actors and assert a property interest as well.  No cost-benefit 
calculation takes place.  This dynamic sheds light on the patent paradox.  Some begin to 
seek a patent over an innovation hitherto believed unpatentable, such as a business 
method or a gene fragment.  Others cue their behavior off these propertization pioneers 
and seek patent rights for themselves as well.  The patent application deluge that 
followed NIH’s applications for patents on gene fragments exemplifies this group 
behavior dynamic.  As a leader in the scientific community, NIH served the societal 
function of a front row theater-goer standing to applaud.  Other researchers and 
institutions followed its lead.  The on-going movement for the creation of sui generis 
intellectual property regimes over traditional knowledge may also have a group behavior 
dynamic.  If enough prominent developing countries call for such rights, other developing 
countries follow suit.   
 
Demsetz pointed to the Montagnes Indians of Quebec to illustrate his theory.  
Traditionally, the Montagnes had an open access hunting regime.132  By the beginning of 
the eighteenth century, they began to allocate exclusive hunting rights among tribe 
members.133  According to Demsetz, they did so because the introduction of the colonial 
commercial fur trade increased the economic value of furs.134  With the advent of this 
commercial trade, the benefits of a closed property regime became greater than the 
benefits of the open access hunting regime that preceded it.135  Consequently, the 
Montagnes, in efficiency maximizing fashion, adopted private property rights over the 
land containing beavers.  As Thomas Merrill points out, even if one accepts Demsetz’s 
explanation of why property rights evolve, the process through which they evolve has 
long remained “a black box.”136   How does a society transition from point A, a situation 
without exclusive property rights, to point B, a situation with extensive property rights?   
 
While no one can speak for the Montagnes, group behavior insights can help 
unravel the transition process mystery.  The commercial fur trade likely explains why 
some Montagnes, seeking to profit from the trade, sought a property interest in the land 
containing beavers.  Their demands for property rights, particularly if they held positions 
of prominence in the community, may have generated a chain reaction of similar property 
                                                          
 
132 Demsetz, supra n. 11 at 352. 
 
133 Id. (citing Eleanor Leacock, The Montagnes ‘Hunting Territory’ and the Fur Trade, AMERICAN 
ANTHROPOLOGIST, Vol. 56, No. 5, Part 2, Memoir No. 78 at 15).  
 
134 Id. at 351-352. 
 
135 An often mentioned application of Demsetz’s thesis involves the advent of barbed wire in the American 
West.  This technological advance engendered the establishment of property rights in land for grazing 
cattle.  It did so not by increasing the value of cattle but by reducing the cost of establishing a property 
regime in grazing land.  Prior to barbed wire, people found it too costly to enclose cattle and to establish 
fixed land rights for ranchers. 
 
136 Merrill, supra n. 7 at 336.  See also, Dukemier & Krier, supra  n. 10 at 57 (“how the transformation of 
private property comes about remains a mystery.”)  
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claims by others.  These others likely had little information about the value of fur relative 
to the cost of controlling it.  Rather they patterned their behavior on the behavior of those 
that preceded them.  Demsetz explicitly refrained from taking a position on whether 
adjustments in property rights would result from a conscious endeavor.137  Group 
behavior insights as well as the case studies discussed above indicate that in many cases 
it is highly unlikely that the affected community makes a conscious cost-benefit 
calculation.  The emergence of private property or other more exclusive property regimes 
simply may be a bad idea whose time has come.   
 
B.  Breach of a Cooperative Norm 
 
As John Dawson observed three decades ago, “Uncompensated gains are 
pervasive and universal; our well-being and survival depend on them…”138  And so we 
share.  Indeed, experiments show that people cooperate and forgo free riding much more 
often then economists predict.139   In fact, if most people cooperate and share “the social 
meaning of non-cooperation is greed.”140 
 
However, if some stop sharing and cooperating, preferring instead to claim certain 
property or knowledge as exclusively their own,  continuing to share under such 
circumstances transforms the good public citizen into a public patsy.   Game theorists 
have shown that in a repeated game, players will cooperate in the first period but will 
defect in subsequent periods if the other player defected in the immediately preceding 
period.141   Absent such defection, they will continue to cooperate.142 
 
Underlying the creation of property rights over raw genetic and biological 
material lays a desire by those demanding such rights that others not exploit them.   
When individuals and corporations began to patent isolated and purified genetic 
sequences, cell lines and living organisms, those from whom the raw biological material 
came felt exploited.   Nations with a history of colonial exploitation had a heightened 
sensitivity to such exploitation.143  They no longer viewed the sharing of raw biological 
material as international collaboration but rather as “biocolonialism.” As the president of 
Tanzania said, “[M]ost of us in developing countries find it difficult to accept the notion 
that biodiversity should [flow freely to industrial countries] while the flow of biological 
products from the industrial countries is patented, expensive and considered the private 
                                                          
137 Demsetz, supra n. 11 at 350. 
 
138 John P. Dawson, The Self-Serving Intermeddler, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1412 (1974). 
 
139 Cass Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV 903, 945 (1996). 
 
140 Id. 
 
141 Douglas G. Baird, Robert H. Gertner, and Randal C. Picker, GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 313 (1994) 
(calling this strategy “tit-for-tat”).  See also, Robert Axelrod, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984). 
 
142 Id.  
 
143  I thank Professor Tanya Hernandez for this point. 
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property of the firms that produce them.  This asymmetry … is unjust.”144   Developing 
countries created property rights over material that they had previously shared to prevent 
others from taking advantage of them.   
 
A similar sentiment animates patient property claims to biological specimens.  
Patients willing donated biological specimens when they believed they were contributing 
to a greater social good.145  The obtainment of patent rights by researchers and 
institutions over cell lines and genetic sequences breached this cooperative spirit.    
Contributors, like those who joined the effort to find the gene responsible for Canavans 
disease as well as John Moore, felt taken advantage of.146   Their fury and sense of 
violation do not stem from concern over lost potential economic opportunities but rather 
from being played the patsy.        
 
In the case of traditional knowledge, when developed countries began to insist 
that developing countries cease copying intellectual property goods developed in the 
West, developing countries expressed resentment over the knowledge that they had 
shared with the West.    It was one thing for societies effectively to share knowledge with 
each other.  It was quite another for advanced societies to wrap their knowledge in a web 
of intellectual property protections, while freely using the traditional knowledge of their 
less developed counterparts.   
            
C.  Fear of Exclusion 
 
Of property’s attributes,147 most consider the right of the holder to exclude others 
to be the most important.148    In the case of intellectual property, the right to exclude is 
                                                          
 
144 Statement of President Ali Hassan Mwinyi of Tanzania quoted in Andrew G & Charles Weiss, 16 STAN. 
ENVTL. L.J. 74, 89 (1997). 
 
145 On the benefits of altruism, see Richard M. Titmuss, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO 
SOCIAL POLICY 195-246 (1971). 
 
146 See discussion supra pp. 12-15. 
 
147 Honoré identifies the following incidents of property: (1) the right to exclusive possession;  (2) the right 
to personal use and enjoyment; (3) the right to manage use by others; (4) the right to the income from use 
by others;(5) the right to the capital value, including alienation, consumption, waste, or destruction; (6) the 
right to security (that is, immunity from expropriation); (7) the power of transmissibility by gift, devise, or 
descent;(8) the lack of any term on these rights; (9) the duty to refrain from using the object in ways that 
harm others;(10) the liability to execution for repayment of debts; and (11) residual rights on the reversion 
of lapsed ownership rights held by others. A.M. Honoré, Ownership, in Oxford Essays in JURISPRUDENCE 
107, at 112-128(A.G. Guest ed., 1961).  
 
148 Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730 (1998) (arguing that the 
right to exclude others is the sine qua non of property but also identifying other schools of thought who, 
while agreeing that property rights generally involve some right to exclude, they disagree that the rights to 
exclude is the core right) and Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV 357 (1954) 
(characterizing property as something to which the following can be attached: “To the world: Keep off X 
unless you have my permission, which I may grant or withhold.”)   
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the central and, in the case of patents, the only right accorded.149   I suggest the following 
corollary:  Of property’s attributes, the one most likely to inspire fear among non-holders 
of a property interest is that they will be excluded from its use.    When some begin to 
demand and receive new property rights, others naturally experience concern that they 
will no longer enjoy the ability to use the previously common resource.    They respond 
by securing a property right for themselves in the good that is now the new object of 
propertization.  In the alternative, they demand the creation of new property rights over 
some related good that they can exchange for access to the first object of propertization. 
 
 This fear animates much of the frenetic patent activity underlying the patent 
paradox.150  Companies and institutions feel compelled to obtain patents over slight and 
even dubious innovations out of concern that if they do not have such patents, they will 
have no currency to trade for access to other patented and potentially equally slight 
innovations.    As Internet Patent News Service editor Gregory Aharonian explains: “The 
big guys couldn’t care less about the quality of their patents …. They just want as many 
as possible because they trade them like baseball cards.  When you have a thousand 
patents and your competition has 1,500, you don’t care what they are, you just swap 
them.”151  Fear of exclusion also helps to explain why so many rushed to file patent 
applications over gene fragments.  They feared that, unless they obtained such patents, 
those who did would exclude them from entire fields of innovation.                      
 
The demand by developing countries for property rights over raw biological 
material partly arose from their concern that patent holders would exclude them from 
enjoying the benefits of technology, particularly biotechnology.   Developing countries 
sought property rights over raw biological material partly to leverage such rights for 
access to patented technologies.  The language and structure of the CBD itself evidences 
the creation of sovereign property rights as a means of leverage against other property 
rights.  Article 15 of the CBD, entitled “Access to genetic resources,” goes hand in hand 
with Article 16, entitled “Access to and transfer of technology.”   After effectively 
vesting national governments with the right to control access to genetic resources,152 
Article 15 stipulates that sovereigns should facilitate access to such material.153   Article 
16 links such sharing with the sharing of technological innovations, particularly 
                                                          
149 See 35 U.S.C.  Sec. 271(a).   
 
150 One often sees today’s patent environment described as a frenzy.  See e.g., Greg Aharonian, Legal 
Resources for Surviving the Patenting Frenzy of the Internet, Bioinformatics, and Electronic Commerce, at 
http://www.bustpatents.com. 
 
151 Denise Caruso, Digital Commerce, NY Times, Feb. 1, 1999, at C4.  
 
152 Article 15(1), “recognizing the sovereign right of States over their natural resources,” recognizes that 
“the authority to determine access to genetic resources rests with the national government,” while Article 
15(5) provides that access to this material requires “the prior informed consent of the [nation] providing 
such resources.” 
 
153  Art. 15(3) of the CBD (Each Party “shall endeavor to create conditions to facilitate access to genetic 
resources”).  
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technologies which utilize provided genetic material.154   Together Articles 15 and 16 
envision a world where developing countries provide raw genetic material in exchange 
for technological goods and know-how.155   
 
One can also see the development of property rights as a means of leverage 
against other property rights in the re-negotiation of the International Undertaking on 
Plant Genetic Resources.  Following the entry into force of the CBD, negotiations began 
to harmonize the International Undertaking with the CBD.  These negotiations centered 
on whether nations would continue to share plant genetic material freely with each other 
to promote global food security or whether a more restrictive regime would govern.   
During the negotiations, prominent developing country representatives repeatedly offered 
to provide access to the raw genetic material of all plants in their countries, if developed 
countries would provide access to patented agricultural goods.156        
      
III. Three Consequences of the Chain Reaction Evolution of Property Rights 
 
The above discussion shows how and why the creation of new property rights can 
trigger a chain reaction of propertization, whereby individuals and societies respond to 
these new or expanded rights by demanding the generation of yet additional property 
rights.  The chain reaction theory for the evolution of property rights has three key 
implications. 
 
                                                          
 
154 Article 15(7) of the CBD states:  “Each Contracting Party shall take … measures … with the aim of 
sharing in a fair and equitable way the results of research and development and the benefits arising from the 
… utilization of genetic resources with the [Nation] providing such resources.”   In Article 16(1), Parties 
emphasize that technology “includes biotechnology,” and undertake to provide or facilitate access to 
“technologies that … make use of genetic resources…”  Article 16(2) provides that access to and transfer 
of this technology “shall be provided and/or facilitated under fair and most favourable terms, including on 
concessional and preferential terms where mutually agreed,” but where technology is “subject to patents 
and other intellectual property rights, such access and transfer shall be provided on terms which recognize 
and are consistent with the adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights..”  Article 16(3) 
provides that each Party to the Convention shall take measures “with the aim that Contracting Parties, in 
particular those that are developing countries, which provide access to genetic resources are provided 
access to and transfer of technology which makes use of those resources, on mutually agreed terms, 
including technology protected by patents and other intellectual property rights, where necessary through 
[financial mechanism] and in accordance with international law…”   
  
155 Other articles of the CBD also support this outcome.  For example, Article 19(1) states that each party 
shall take measures “to provide for the effective participation in [its] biotechnological research activities” 
by Parties who have provided access to genetic resources, particularly developing country parties.  
Meanwhile, Article 19(2) requires Parties to take practicable measures to promote priority access “on a fair 
and equitable basis” to the results and benefits of biotechnologies to countries, particularly developing 
countries, who provided genetic resources used in those technologies, provided such access is done on 
mutually agreed terms. 
   
156 I participated in these negotiations and personally heard these interventions.  These negotiations 
ultimately resulted in the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (Rome, 
Nov. 3, 2001), available at http:www.fao.org/ag/cgrfa.  
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A.  Collateral and Unexpected Property Regimes 
 
First, as demonstrated above, the creation of property rights in one sphere, may 
spawn the creation of property rights in a related though other sphere.  Importantly, those 
who demand the creation of the initial rights as well as the government actors who 
fashion these rights appear not to anticipate the wave of collateral property rights that 
arise in response to the creation of the initial property rights.   
 
For example, the thousands of pages filed, read and debated in the Chakrabarty 
proceedings address the moral, legal, social, environmental and economic aspects of 
extending patents to living organisms.  Petitioner, the U.S. PTO, opposed such patents, 
inter alia, on the grounds that such patents raised serious economic and social 
questions.157  The People’s Business Corporation argued that such patents would 
concentrate wealth in a few multinational corporations, create biohazards and reduce 
biological diversity.158  According to the American Patent Law Association, biological 
patents would promote innovation.159  Meanwhile, the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 
Association found “no compelling economic, social, or moral reasons to distinguish” 
biotechnological inventions from other innovations.160  Genentech emphasized the 
extraordinary benefits that biotechnology would bring humanity,161 while another amicus 
discussed at length the societal benefits of Chakrabarty’s invention to a small Long Island 
shipping village.162  Not one brief opposing Chakrabarty’s patent mentions that the 
extension of patents to life forms might, let alone would, cause donors of raw biological 
samples, such as patients and developing countries, to claim a responsive property right 
in these raw materials.163  Those involved in Chakrabarty, from the litigants, to the amici, 
                                                          
157 1980 WL 339757 (Appellate Brief) Brief for the Petitioner (Jan. 04, 1980). 
 
158 1979 WL 200005 (Appellate Brief) Brief on Behalf of the Peoples Business Commission, Amicus 
Curiae (Dec. 13, 1979). 
 
159 1980 WL 339772 (Appellate Brief) Brief on Behalf on the American Patent Law Association, Inc., 
Amicus Curiae (Jan. 29, 1980) 
 
160 1980 WL 339771 (Appellate Brief) Brief on Behalf of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, 
Amicus Curiae (Jan. 29, 1980). 
 
161 1980 WL 339766 (Appellate Brief) Brief on Behalf of Genentech, Inc., Amicus Curiae (Jan. 28, 1980). 
 
162 1979 WL 200006 (Appellate Brief) Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae and Brief of Cornell 
D. Cornish (Dec. 12, 1979). 
  
163 Supra notes 98-103; 1980 WL 339758 (Appellate Brief) Brief for the Respondent (Jan. 28, 1980); 1980 
WL 339773 (Appellate Brief) Brief of Dr. George Pieczenik as Amicus Curiae (Jan. 29, 1980); 1980 WL 
3397669 (Appellate Brief) Brief on Behalf of the New York Patent Law Association, Inc., Amicus Curiae 
(Jan. 28, 1980); 1980 WL 339770 (Appellate Brief) Brief Amicus Curiae of the Regents of the University 
of California (Jan. 28, 1980); 1980 WL 339764 (Appellate Brief) Brief of: Dr. Leroy E. Hood, Dr. Thomas 
P. Maniatis, Dr. David S. Eisenberg, The American Society of Biological Chemists, The Association of 
American Colleges, The California Institute of Technology, The American Council on Education as Amici 
Curiae (Jan. 26. 1980); 1979 WL 200007 (Appellate Brief) Brief on Behalf of the American Society for 
Microbiology, Amicus Curiae (Oct. Term 1979). 
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to the Supreme Court Justices themselves, all believed that they were simply deciding the 
extent to which property rights would extend to “man’s handiwork.”164   No one 
anticipated that their decision would alter the hitherto accepted norm of the relatively free 
availability of samples of nature’s handiwork.   Twenty-five years after Chakrabarty, 
ownership increasingly constitutes the norm not only for man-made living organisms, 
isolated genetic material and cell lines, but also, unexpectedly, for samples of raw 
biological materials. 
 
Similarly, those pressing for the international expansion of western intellectual 
property rights do not appear to have anticipated responsive demands for the creation of 
property rights over traditional knowledge.  The legislative history on Special Clause 301 
mentions no such prospect.165  Those negotiating the TRIPs Agreement for the United 
States seemingly did not foresee the eventual responsive demand for intellectual property 
rights over traditional knowledge.   In fact it does not appear that this response was even 
on their radar screens.  Commentators on the history of the TRIPs Agreement do not 
mention traditional knowledge as an issue during the negotiations and confirm that calls 
to protect traditional knowledge came later.166    In the same vein, when developed 
countries insisted on the acknowledgement of Breeders’ Rights within the International 
Undertaking, they did not anticipate the responsive rise of Farmers’ Rights.167 
 
B.  The Importance of First Movers 
 
Second, the chain reaction theory for the evolution of property rights indicates 
that those who first demand property rights play a critical and underestimated role in the 
evolution of property rights.  These propertization pioneers can trigger a chain reaction of 
demands for similar or different yet related property rights.    The role that NIH played in 
the frenzy to patent genetic fragments beautifully illustrates the importance of first 
movers.   When NIH sought to patent gene fragments, other researchers and institutions 
followed its lead and stampeded to the patent office.  Decision-makers, therefore, must 
exercise extreme caution before bowing to the demands of these first movers.  
Accommodating their propertization requests can create a chain reaction of similar or 
related but different property requests by others.   
 
                                                          
164 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 306.  
165 The legislative history of Special 201 appears in HR Conf. Rep. 100-576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 514, 
550-87 (1988), reprinted in 1988 USCAAN 1547, 1583-1620 (1988). 
166 See e.g., J.H. Reichmann, Symposium: Uruguay Round – GATT/WTO, Universal Minimum Standards of 
Intellectual Property Protection under the TRIPs Component of the WTO Agreement, INTL Lawyer 345, 
382-385 (1995)(discussing overall history of the TRIPs Agreement and likely response of developing 
countries but not mentioning anything about traditional knowledge or restriction of access to biological 
materials); Helfer, supra n 37; Yu, supra n. 74 at 357-70, 386-88 (discussing history of TRIPs and 
mentioning how the calls to protect traditional knowledge came later).  See also, A.O. Adele, The Political 
History of the TRIPS Agreement: Origins and History of the Negotiations (2001) available at 
http://www.ictsd.org. 
 
167 Discussions between author and Dr. Henry Shands, formerly with the U.S. Department of Agriculture. 
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Furthermore, as the case studies illustrate, courts and legislatures themselves can 
trigger a chain reaction when they create new property rights or expand existing ones.  At 
present, decision-makers usually appear unaware that their actions can set off a process 
with widespread and, as demonstrated below, potentially undesirable implications.  The 
chain reaction theory cautions decision-makers to think carefully before expanding 
property rights, particularly in borderline cases, and to build in restrictions on these rights 
more thoughtfully.  At a minimum, decision-makers should exercise particular care 
before expanding property rights in situations where people have identified potential 
spillover effects. 168  For example, scholars, news services and academic organizations 
raised concerns that proposed new intellectual property rights over databases risked 
dramatically curtailing access to data itself.169  Congress has so far refrained from 
creating property rights for databases and thereby has avoided initiating a chain reaction 
that would have likely led to the propertization of data.     
      
 
C.  Inefficient and Less Happy Outcomes 
 
Third, the chain reaction thesis anticipates less efficient and happy outcomes than 
those suggested by Demsetz’s thesis.  While the initial creation of property rights may 
follow Demsetz’s optimistic cost-benefit scenario, the second wave of property rights that 
it triggers appears to have little to do with any efficient economic calculus.  Rather, it is 
responsive in nature.  Those pressing for these second generation rights often simply 
imitate those before them or may seek to retaliate against the new first generation 
property norms that they object to.   They seek new property rights out of a sense of 
justice.  They fear that unless they receive new property rights, which they can trade 
against the first generation rights, they will suffer exclusion from the marketplace.    
When one takes into account the second generation property rights created in reaction to 
the first generation rights, the overall scenario may be less efficient than the property 
regime that preceded it.  It is, at a minimum, less happy than the scenario anticipated by 
Demsetz’s thesis.       
 
                                                          
168 I thank Professor Pamela Samuelson for this point. 
 
169 The Database and Collections of Information Misappropriation Act (H.R. 3261), introduced on October 
8, 2003, 108th Cong..  Opposition based on the bill’s likely interference with access to data included 
NetCoalition, a coalition of internet service providers and large internet related companies such as Google, 
Yahoo, Bloomberg and CNET, the American Civil Liberties Union and the National Academy of 
Engineering.  See Database Protection: A Primer on the Debate in Congress Over Creating a New 
Property Right in Facts, available at http://www.netcoalition.com and Grant Gross, Congress Questions 
Database Protection Proposal, INFOWORLD, Sept. 23, 2003, available at 
http://www.infoworld.com/archives/emailPrint.jsp?R=printThis&A/article/03/09/23/HNd.  Earlier 
testimony of William Wulf, on behalf of the U.S. National Academies of Sciences, the National Academy 
of Engineering and the Institute of Medicine, before The House Committee on Energy and Commerce on 
September 23, 2003, warned that any database legislation must take care to preserve the public-domain 
status of factual information; and where uncertainty exists as to whether the effect of potential legislation 
might extend exclusive property rights to the factual information itself, Congress should “err on the side of 
caution.” Available at 
http://energycommerce.house.gov/reparchives/108/Hearings/09232002hearing1086/hearing.htm.    
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Turning first to property rights over biological and genetic material, as discussed 
earlier, the extension of property rights to man-made living organisms and their genetic 
material established by Chakrabarty and its progeny caused developing country national 
governments that possessed unimproved biological material to assert property rights over 
this material.  These property regimes are extremely costly to create, to administer and to 
enforce.170  They essentially require countries to prevent most, if not all, sub-cellular 
genetic sequences of potential economic value from leaving their country without 
government authorization.  Complying with these regimes also entails substantial 
expense,171 and the regimes suffer from anticommons problems.  An anticommons can 
occur when multiple individuals or entities have rights of exclusion to a given 
resource.172   Anticommons problems exist because bioprospectors (those searching for 
potentially useful genetic material) must now obtain the consent of multiple property 
rights-holders, including the national government, local communities, and individuals, 
before removing raw biological samples.173   
 
Impressive revenue streams have not offset these high costs.  In fact, rather than 
generating much revenue for their countries, the laws that restrict access to genetic 
material have caused scientists and corporations to cease or minimize their 
bioprospecting activity.174  For example, after spending one million dollars and two years 
attempting to navigate Colombia’s access-restricting regime, BioAndes, a private joint 
venture between a U.S. pharmaceutical company and a Colombian concern, abandoned 
its efforts not only in Colombia but also in the entire Andean Pact region.175  For every 
bioprospecting success story, there are dozens of cases where the projects never got off 
the ground.176 An extensive study conducted by Columbia University unearthed few 
                                                          
170 Christopher D. Stone, New Issues for a New Century: Land Use, Biodiversity, and Ecosystem Integrity, 
27 Ecology L.Q. 967, 985 (2001); Jacoby & Weiss, supra n. 144, at 93.  See also, Safrin, supra n. 3 at 649-
657 (describing the cumbersome and complex nature of the access-restricting laws).   
 
171 See generally Kerry ten Kate and Sarah A. Laird, THE COMMERCIAL USE OF BIODIVERSITY (1999) at 32 
(noting that access regimes are elaborate and that many domestic and foreign scientists and companies 
report finding them cumbersome, time-consuming and costly to follow).   
 
172 Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 
111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 622, 677 (1998). 
 
173 Safrin, supra n. 3 at 652-657 (describing the anticommons problems created by developing countries  
access-restricting regimes). 
 
174 Id. at 657-658, 668; David Labrador, Refining Green Gold, SCI. AM., Dec. 2003, at 38; Colin 
Macilwain, When Rhetoric Hits Reality in Debate on Bioprospecting, 392 NATURE 535 (1998).  
  
175 Columbia Access Paper, supra n. 35 at 35-43.  Andes Pharmaceuticals, Inc., one of the venture’s 
principal partners, was “founded as a direct response to the CBD with the ‘mission to invert the current 
model for natural products drug discovery’ by taking ‘state of the art technology to countries rich in 
biological diversity.’” Id.at 35. In addition, a Colombian national abandoned a bioprospecting project 
altogether after realizing the ramifications of the application process.  Id. at 43. 
 
176 Safrin, supra n. 3 at 657; Christopher Locke, Forest Pharmers Go Bioprospecting, RED HERRING, Apr. 
1, 2001, at 84, available at http://www. redherring.com.  See also, Brown, supra note   (reporting how there 
has been little commercial interest in bioprospecting and noting how most of the projects have been U.S. 
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successful bioprospecting cases.177  Meanwhile, companies report that the CBD has 
caused them to rely more heavily on ex situ collections rather than brave the source 
countries’ laws and regulations that restrict access to raw genetic material.178   In the 
aftermath of the CBD, the collection of this material has slowed to a trickle. 
 
These regimes have failed to generate much revenue for their countries and the 
restrictive climate created by the CBD and these regimes hamper the sharing of genetic 
material.179  We see a similar trend with respect to biological specimens obtained from 
patients.  While patients used to readily donate these samples, today prior informed 
consent agreements and legal arrangements encumber these donations.180   
 
Moreover, researchers no longer share genetic and biological material as freely 
with each other.181  Concern over the growing unwillingness by scientists to share 
tangible research material prompted the NIH in 1999 to issue guidelines to encourage 
sharing.182  The restrictive trend, however, continues.  A 2005 study of genomics 
researchers found that, while most continued to receive tangible research material from 
their colleagues, the level of noncompliance with material transfer requests in 2003-2004 
increased 80% over noncompliance levels in the late 1990s.183  The study projected even 
                                                                                                                                                                             
government subsidized). A fairly comprehensive three-hundred page book by Sarah Laird and Kerry ten 
Kate, supra n. 161, on access and benefit-sharing under the CBD discusses surprisingly few non-
government examples of bioprospecting projects involving access to specimens of genetic material for 
research and then potential application in a biotechnological good, since the adoption CBD. A large 
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bulk cultivation of Kava for export etc.   
 
177 Columbia Access Paper, supra n. 35.  
 
178 Laird and ten Kate, supra n. 171. 
 
179 Safrin, supra n. 3 and Brown, supra n. at A-144 (noting that the expansions of patents in the area of 
biotechnology research eventually made it increasingly difficult for ethnobotanists to collect wild plant 
specimens). 
 
180 See e.g., Genomics and World Health: Report of the Advisory Committee on Health Research 116, 
WHO Advisory Committee on Health Research (2002)(hereinafter “WHO Genomics Report 2002”) 
available at http://www3.who.int/whois/genomics/genormics_report.cfm; at 7.5 and 7.4.4 (describing how 
the patenting of the genetic material of indigenous people is increasing opposition to population genetic 
studies). 
 
181 Supra p. 22 and n. 69. 
 
182 Dept. of Health and Human Services, 64 Fed. Reg. 72090 (1999).   
 
183 John P. Walsh, Charlene Cho, and Wesley M. Cohen, View from the Bench: Patents and Material 
Transfers, 309 SCIENCE 2002 (2005).  For the full study see, John P. Walsh, Charlene Cho & Wesley M. 
Cohen, Patents, Material Transfers and Access to Research Inputs in Biomedical Research (Sept. 20, 
2005), available at http://tigger.uic.edu/~jwalsh/NASReport.html. 
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higher rates of noncompliance in the future.184  The study found that this lack of sharing 
significantly impeded research.  One in fourteen respondents said that noncompliance by 
other academics with material transfer requests caused them to abandon at least one 
project each year, and one in six respondents reported that delays in receiving material 
from other academics caused them to substantially delay their projects.185           
 
Patent rights in the genetics area also appear to be spiraling to an inefficient and 
unhappy outcome. By mid-2000, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) had 
issued over 6,000 patents on full-length genes isolated from living organisms and had 
under consideration over 20,000 gene-related patent applications.186   In a frenzy, 
researchers and companies rush to patent genes and parts of genes that they have isolated 
before someone else does.187  All of this frenetic genetic patenting activity is, or at a 
minimum, risks creating an anticommons in genetic material that deters innovation.188  
As patentees acquire thousands of patents on genetic sequences for specific genes and 
fragments of genes, moving forward with any particular gene therapy requires securing 
the consent of these multiple patent holders.189  Obtaining such consent, in turn, involves 
high transaction costs to locate and bargain with the holders of all of these gene 
patents.190  Moreover, any one patent holder can thwart a project entirely by refusing to 
license its individual genetic component unless it receives a bribe.191   For example, 
estimates indicate that the scientists who created the celebrated “golden rice” (a strain of 
rice genetically-engineered for enhanced vitamin A) may have infringed as many as 
                                                          
184 Id. at 2002-03. 
 
185 Id. at 2003. 
 
186  Demaine & Fallmeth, supra n. 5 at 359.  “Over a sixth of these patents cover whole human genes and 
many of their significant alleles.”  Id. For an explanation of how one patents a gene, see supra n. 5.  
 
187 See generally, Nicholas Thompson, Gene Blues, WASH. MONTHLY, April 2001, at 9 (describing race to 
patent genetic sequences).  
  
188  Michael A. Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation?  The Anticommons in 
Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (May 1, 1998) (pointing to anticommons problems in basic 
medical research), Arti K. Rai, The Information Revolution Reaches Pharmaceuticals: Balancing 
Innovation Incentives, Cost, and Access in the Post-Genomics Era, U. ILL. L. REV. 123, 192-94 (2001) 
(pointing to anticommons problems in the biotechnological field) and Dan L. Burk and Mark A. Lemley, 
Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1625-1626 (2003) (concluding that the biotech industry 
appears particularly susceptible to anticommons problems).  See also, Fiona Murray & Scott Stern, Do 
Formal Intellectual Property Rights Hinder the Free Flow of Scientific Knowledge?  An Empirical Test of 
the Anticommons Hypothesis, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 11465, available at 
http:www.nber.org/papers/w11465 (June 2005)(empirical study of the citation rates of scientific papers 
finds a quantitatively modest but statistically significant anticommons effect.  Citations of papers involving 
patented technologies decline by 9 to 17% after a patent issues.)   
 
189 Burk & Lemley, id. at 1625-26.  
 
190 See generally, id. at 1611 (summarizing effects of an anticommons). 
 
191 Id. The problem is exacerbated even further by “reach through” licenses, whereby the owners of 
upstream patents seek control of and royalties on the downstream uses of their patented genes. Id .at 1626. 
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seventy patents.192  However, the scientists who created the rice, which might prevent 
thousands of cases of blindness a year, report that they could not have created the rice 
had they attempted to identify and secure the consent of all implicated patent holders in 
the process.  According to the developer of the rice, he had to ignore the patents while he 
was experimenting with the rice “or I couldn’t move at all.”193   
 
In addition to anticommons problems, genetic patenting may be leading to a 
related problem of patent thickets.194  In contrast to an anticommons, which requires the 
aggregation of multiple inputs to create a single product, patent thickets occur where 
multiple overlapping patents cover the same technology and can choke an industry.195  In 
a patent thicket environment, holders of patents can prevent each other from fully 
utilizing their patent rights as each holder’s right overlaps with, and hence infringes upon, 
a right held by another.196   
 
Not all agree that the present U.S. system for patenting genetic material is 
generally flawed.197  While some studies suggest an anticommons problem,198 others 
question whether a genetic anticommons of any significance exists.199 For example, a 
2005 study by Walsh, Cho and Cohen failed to find substantial evidence of patents 
limiting basic research.  Only 1% of a random sample of 398 biomedical academics 
                                                          
192 Peter Pringle, FOOD INC. 33 (2003). 
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194 Arti K. Rai, Fostering Cumulative Innovation in the Biopharmaceutical Industry: The Role of Patents 
and Antitrust, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 813, 842 (2001). 
 
195 Burk and Lemley, supra n. 188 at 1627 (describing patent thickets). 
 
196 Id. 
 
197 Richard A. Epstein, Steady the Course: Property Rights in Genetic Material, at 22-26 (March 2003), 
available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/epstein/resources/rae.genome.new.pdf (arguing that the 
current system basically functions well and that the U.S. should “steady the course” and rejecting “middle 
of the road” proposals described above in favor of an “all or nothing” approach where some genetic 
substances, like EST fragments, would be left in the public domain, but everything else would be governed 
by the usual rules of patent protection.)  See also, Eric Mauer, Comment, An Economic Justification for a 
Broad Interpretation of Patentable Subject Matter, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1057, 1090 (2001)(favoring a broad 
interpretation of patentable subject matter).  
 
198 Supra n. 188.  
 
199 Charles R. McMannis & Sucheol Noh, The Impact of the Bayh-Dole Act on Genetic Research and 
Development: Evaluating the Arguments and Empirical Evidence to Date (Aug. 13, 2006 Working Paper 
available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/ipsc/papers2/mcmanis.doc)(summarizing recently 
released studies concerning the impact of Bayh-Dole on genetic research and concluding that anticommons 
concerns have been overstated).  Earlier articles challenging an anticommons effect include John Doll, 280 
SCIENCE 700 (May 1, 1998); John P. Walsh, Ashish Arora, Wesley M. Cohen, Work Through the Patent 
Problem, 299 SCIENCE 1021 (2003)(concluding that strong patent protection in the area of research tools 
has little thwarted innovation); and  66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289 (2003) at n. 47 (discussing patent 
thicket but that companies response has been to put things into the public domain.).   
   
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
38 
reported project delays of over a month due to patents and patents had not caused any to 
completely abandon a line of research.200  However, a report by the National Research 
Council expresses concern about the future.  It concludes that the lack of substantial 
evidence for an anticommons or patent thicket problem among biomedical researchers 
may simply be due to a lack of awareness among investigators about relevant patent 
rights, and this is changing.201  Indeed, the Walsh study revealed that when scientists 
believed that their research implicated another’s patent, some 30% either changed their 
research approach or substantially delayed their work.202  Overall, most scholars believe 
that the patent system in the genetics area has overreached and inhibits innovation.203 
 
The overprivitization of genetic material has a high cost.  The anticommons and 
other problems engendered by both the sovereign-based and the patent-based ownership 
systems lead to the under-utilization of potentially helpful genetic material.  As a result, 
society incurs the opportunity cost of not enjoying potentially helpful drugs, therapeutics 
and other bioengineered goods.  In addition, the extensive assertion of property rights 
over genetic material means that society forgoes the benefits of more open systems.204   
                                                          
200 Walsh et. al., supra n. 183.   
 
201 National Research Council, REAPING THE BENEFITS OF GENOMIC AND PROTEOMIC RESEARCH: 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND PUBLIC HEALTH (2005). 
 
202 Walsh et. al, supra n. 183.   At present, researchers may be gambling that patent holders will not sue 
them.  This could rapidly change if a high-profile Napster-like case was brought against researchers and 
their institutions. 
 
203 See Andrew Chin, Research in the Shadow of DNA Patents, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 846, 
905 (2005)(demonstrating how even a small number of oligonucleotide patents would impair two of the 
most promising procedures for the discovery of other oligonucleotides and DNA molecules and concluding 
that the patenting of DNA molecules actually retards the “identification and sequencing of so many other 
useful DNA molecules” that DNA patents do not promote the discovery and disclosure of  DNA molecules 
in aggregate); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Varying the Course in Patenting Genetic Material: A Counter-
Proposal to Richard Epstein’s Steady the Course at 1 (2003) available at http;/ssrn.com/abstract id+394000 
(disagreeing with Epstein, noting that “the literature questioning aspects of genomic patenting and 
proposing all sorts of interventions” to limit the innovation inhibiting aspects of this patenting activity, like 
compulsory licensing, experimental use defenses and condemnation proceedings, is growing “large” and 
“fast.”); Heller and Eisenberg, supra  n. 188  and Rai, The Information Revolution, supra n. 188 at 192-94.  
See also, Demaine & Fallmeth, supra note 5 and Philippe Jacobs and Geertrui Van Overwalle, Gene 
Patents: A Different Approach EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 505 (2001) (arguing that patents should not be 
granted for DNA but only for downstream medical goods). Others, while accepting the patent eligibility of 
isolated naturally-occurring genes, have proffered a series of mechanisms, such as a research fair-use 
exception or compulsory licensing, to diminish the reach and the innovation-inhibiting effects of these gene 
patents.  See e.g., Donna M. Gitter, International Conflicts Over Patenting of Genetic Sequences in the 
United States and the European Union: An Argument for Compulsory Licensing and A Fair-Use 
Exemption, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1623 (2001); Janice M. Mueller, No “Dilettante Affair”: Rethinking the 
Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1, 
58-66 (2001)(suggesting a broad compulsory licensing system.)  Hollman & Munzer, supra n. 111 
(proposing an ASCAP system for genes, whereby all would have access to registered isolated and 
identified genes upon payment of a fixed fee.)         
 
204 See generally, Brett M. Frischmann, The Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons 
Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917 (2005) (identifying classes of resources that generate positive 
externalities for society if maintained as an open access or commons goods); James Boyle, SHAMANS, 
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In the case of genetic material, the open system that predated extensive sovereign 
and private rights over genetic material had numerous advantages.   The widespread 
sharing of biological material that occurred under the open system increased rather than 
decreased the global genetic pool because it ensured the maintenance of genetic material 
in multiple locations.205  It resulted, for example, in the widespread distribution and 
preservation of crops and crop varieties away from their places of origin.206   This 
benefited all.  For example, under the open system, grapevine varieties from France were 
brought to the United States.  Later blight destroyed much of France’s vineyards. 207   The 
United States sent grape root stocks back to France to rejuvenate France’s ravished 
vineyards.208 The American wine industry bases itself in part on vines from France.  The 
French wine industry in turn bases itself in part on repatriated grape root stocks from the 
United States.  The open system also facilitated the improvement of genetic material. For 
example, breeders created the semi-dwarf varieties of wheat and rice that formed the 
bedrock of the Green Revolution from raw genetic material freely obtained from 
Japan.209  In turn, these improved semi-dwarf varieties were rapidly shared throughout 
the world.210   The open system also produced ex situ international and national structures 
to conserve, share and improve biological and genetic material as well as facilitated 
international collaboration between scientists.211   
                                                                                                                                                                             
SOFTWARE AND SPLEENS 9-10, 119, 125 (1996)(arguing for an expansion of the public domain, pointing to 
the “erroneous belief that the greater the level of intellectual protection, the greater the progress” and 
arguing that intellectual property regimes “can actually slow down scientific progress, diminish the 
opportunities for creativity and curtail the availability of new products.”)  Kemal Baslar, THE CONCEPT OF 
THE COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1998) (The Romans believed that sharing 
certain basic resources would further the common interest); and Carol M. Rose, The Comedy of the 
Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 768-70, 775-
81(1986)(generally setting forth the benefits of open access goods which enable a society to become 
wealthier by maintaining certain things, such as roads, as openly accessible). 
 
205 Stephen Brush, Genetically Modified Organisms in Peasant Farming: Social Impact and Equity, 9 IND. 
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 135, 157 (2001) (“Genetic resources retain their viability partly because they 
are shared so widely.”)  Some resources benefit from being shared, creating “a more the merrier effect.”  
Carol M. Rose, Essay, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission Trades 
and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 181-82 (1998).  Genetic resources constitute this kind of resource.   
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207 See generally George Ordish, THE GREAT WINE BLIGHT (1972). 
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209 Pringle, supra n. 192. 
 
210 Brush, supra n. 205. 
 
211 Safrin, supra n 3 at 671.   The Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) 
represents an excellent example of the collection, sharing and improvement of genetic resources that 
flourished under the open system. The CGAIR system consists of sixteen international research centers that 
hold and improve seed and other plant material collected from around the world.  Geoffrey Hawtin & 
Timothy Reeves, Intellectual Property Rights and Access to Genetic Resources in the Consultative Group 
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The patent paradox and overall patent activity in the United States seems to 
indicate that the U.S. patent system has settled on a sub-optimum level of property rights.  
Between 1983 and 2002, the number of patents issued in the United States roughly 
tripled, growing from 62,000 to 177,000 per year.212  Patent applications also rose 
dramatically with the PTO receiving a staggering 350,000 applications per year by 
2004.213   This would constitute good news, if it signaled that we had become a nation of 
Thomas Edisons.   Yet, international comparisons show that U.S. inventions with 
confirmed worldwide significance grew at a rate less than half that of domestic U.S. 
patent grants in the 1990s.214  The United States appears to be awash in patents of 
questionable merit and of little value.215  IBM, for example, estimated that only forty of 
10,000 patents that it had evaluated had any individual value.216  Courts deem invalid 
almost half of the patents that they review.217  As described above, most patent holders 
never recoup the costs of patent prosecution and perceive their patents to hold so little 
value that they let them lapse rather than pay the periodic maintenance fees.218   
 
This extensive patent activity comes at a high price.  People currently spend 
approximately $4.3 billion annually to obtain patents219 and several billion more to 
enforce them.220  A 2001 survey conducted by the American Intellectual Property Law 
Association estimated the direct litigation costs of a patent infringement lawsuit, where 
one to twenty-five million dollars was at stake, at $2 million per side.221  For cases with 
less than $1 million at risk, costs to each side ran $300,000 to $750,000, often almost 
equaling the amount at stake.222  According to one study, in 1991 U.S. companies spent 
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Derek Trunkey, Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L. J. 435, 442 (2004). 
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over $1 billion enforcing or defending patent lawsuits, while expending only 
approximately $300 million on research and development.223   
 
In addition to these direct monetary costs, intellectual property scholars have 
identified other costs to over-broad intellectual property rights, including that they distort 
markets away from a competitive norm, interfere with the ability of other creators to 
work and can induce over-investment in research and development.224  Extensive patent 
rights improperly granted to trivial innovations can also impede scientific collaboration 
and can deter researchers from pursuing a field.225  These intangible costs are exacerbated 
by the drag that extensive patent rights place on international scientific collaboration and 
international comity.  Jaffe and Lerner conclude that the intangible costs of the present 
U.S. system with its high level of low quality patents greatly exceed even litigation 
costs.226 
 
Property scholars note that property rights are sticky.227  Once societies create 
them, they find them difficult to dislodge, and inefficient and imprudent property regimes 
do not readily self-correct.228  Property rights over genetic material exhibit this stickiness.  
For example, rather then curtailing their control over raw genetic material in light of the 
dearth of bioprospecting activity, sovereigns have tightened their grip over genetic 
material even further by refusing to grant a patent unless the applicant has complied with 
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223 Joshua Lerner, 38 J. LAW ECON. 463 (1995). 
 
224 For a summary of these arguments advanced by David Friedman, Brett Frischmann and others, see 
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Information Markets and the Construction of Propriety Rights, 44 B.C.L.R. 545 (2003)(arguing that 
“expansive construction of intellectual property rights distorts the informational properties of such rights 
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225 Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 
COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1083 (2003). 
 
226 Jaffe and Lerner, supra n. 9 at 174-175.  Jaffe and Lerner, as well as Rai, id. disagree with Lemley.  
Lemley defends PTO’s poor quality of patent examination as rational from an economic perspective 
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extensive energy at the examination stage.  Lemley, Rational Ignorance, supra n. 104. 
 
227   See e.g., Carolyn J. Frantz, Should the Rules of Marital Property Be Normative?, 2004 U CHI LEGAL F 
265, 270 and Merrill, supra n. 7 at S337.   See Carrier, supra n. 9 (finding the increased propertization of 
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Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
42 
their access-restricting regimes.229  The expansion of intellectual property rights that has 
occurred in the last two decades largely exhibits similar tenacity.230 
 
While the press to grant intellectual property rights to traditional knowledge is 
new, it too is unlikely to produce an efficient regime.  First, while initial demands to 
protect traditional knowledge stem from sympathetic groups, such as indigenous 
communities and developing states, any movement to create new property rights to 
protect traditional knowledge will not likely remain limited to knowledge from these 
communities or countries.  The chain reaction thesis predicts that others, including those 
from Western societies, will demand that their Western traditional knowledge receive 
protection as well.   Each year when I teach about international developments to establish 
sui generis property regimes to cover traditional knowledge, some students invariably 
assert that traditional Western knowledge should receive the same protection.231  For 
example, one student recently elaborated on all the property rights that would attach to 
the hamburger.232    The developed country of Portugal has already enacted laws to 
protect traditional knowledge.233   Should the movement to extend intellectual property 
rights to traditional knowledge take root, we will likely see demands to accord 
intellectual property protection not only to the knowledge of shamans but also to the Irish 
jig and to Greek mythology.   
 
Second, the propertization of traditional knowledge may enable corporate moguls 
to own it.  Once folklore is commodified, it can be sold to the highest bidder.  Disney 
Corporation might purchase exclusive rights to Andean or German folklore.  Merck 
might buy the folk remedies of India.   
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231  See e.g., Michael Pesochinsky, Do We Have to Pay for Traditional Knowledge at 18 
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asserting that if intellectual property rights are extended to cover the traditional knowledge of developing 
countries then “the West may justly request” the payment of royalties whenever “the traditional knowledge 
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233 Portugal, Decree-Law No. 111/2002, Article 3 (April 20, 2002) (providing for the registration and the 
protection of traditional knowledge for a 50 year renewable term). 
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Finally, the overall cost to society of propertizing large swaths of traditional 
knowledge would be vast.   “A culture could not exist,” notes Wendy Gordon, if it 
prohibited all free riding.  “Every person’s education involves a form of free riding on his 
predecessors’ efforts, as does every form of scholarship and scientific progress.”234  
According property status to all value would lead to “the ultimate disruption of 
community – paralysis.”235  
             
CONCLUSION 
 
 The chain reaction theory for the evolution of property rights has both explanatory 
power and cautionary implications.  It anticipates and explains the emergence of second 
generation property rights, a phenomenon that has received little attention in the legal 
literature.  It also contributes to unraveling the longstanding mystery of how property 
regimes evolve.  It suggests that at times societies move toward more exclusive property 
regimes though a process of demands for property rights that build upon each other and 
that have little to do with any efficiency calculation.   
 
We live in a time of increased propertization.  The chain reaction theory helps 
explain this trend.  It posits that the creation of property rights for some engenders the 
creation of property rights for others.  Thus, the more property rights a society recognizes 
the more property rights it will have in the future.  Consequently, policy makers must 
exercise extreme caution before bowing to the demands of those who initially seek new 
or expanded property rights.  Granting these rights will likely unleash a chain reaction of 
demands for, and result in the creation of, additional, unanticipated and potentially 
undesirable property regimes.  
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